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Climate change is a major contemporary issue. In response, financial institutions offer green 
financing to fund low-carbon investments to those organizations who want to help mitigate this issue. 
Nevertheless, a lack of green credit remains the case. Therefore, to learn how to close this financing 
gap, this empirical study explores China’s green finance through the lens of the Chinese banks who 
are the providers of such loans. Green finance has been growing rapidly in China since the Chinese 
government issued the Green Credit Policy. Previous studies have posited that banks have incentives 
in the form of credit risk management, new business opportunities, corporate reputation, and 
compliance risk to offer green loans. The objective of this thesis is to ascertain whether green loans 
provide better risk management and more business opportunities in practice. 
As a part of the research, this thesis explores China’s banking system and the development of, and 
current research into, China’s Green Credit Policy. This study identifies a distinct characteristic of the 
Chinese banking system (i.e., heavy government involvement) and posits how the government may 
influence the development of green finance in China. 
A dataset with a panel design was collected to perform the quantitative tests. The dataset contains 
financial and green finance data from 24 banks in China between 2009 and 2015. Panel regression 
techniques, such as Two-stage Least Square Regression Analysis (2sls) and Random-effect Panel 
Regression (RE), were used to examine whether the banks’ green finance practices lead to better 
financial performance. 
The results reveal that green loans grow at a faster rate than do other types of loans, and that 
allocating more green loans to the total loan portfolio reduces a bank’s NPL ratio. The findings imply 
that green financing is a less risky investment with increasing demand. Through empirical evidence, 
this thesis contributes to the existing green finance literature and fills the literature gap on the Green 
Credit Policy in China through its study of the policy’s implementation from the banks’ perspective. 
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Greening the economy involves improving the natural environment and solving climate change 
issues. One of the key issues in this context is related to the financing of climate change mitigation 
and how to close the financing gap to fund low-carbon investments (OECD, 2017). In response to this 
issue, through an empirical study of green finance in China, this thesis aims to provide research into 
the way in which more green credit can be approved.  
In 2007, China overtook the United States as the world's biggest producer of carbon dioxide, 
producing 30% of the global carbon dioxide emissions in 2014 (Vidal & Adam, 2007; Boden, 
Marland, & Andres, 2017). To control carbon emission, the Chinese government issued the Green 
Credit Policy in 2007, requiring banks to offer green credit toward environmental protection, 
emission reduction, and energy conservation projects, as well as to restrain loans to high-pollution, 
high-emission and overcapacity industries. Since then, sustainable and environment-friendly projects 
have been increasing rapidly.  
Chapter 1 provides an introduction of green finance, its current problem, research question, and 
research methodology of the thesis. 
 
1.1 Background of Green Finance 
Since the Industrial Revolution, the increase in carbon-intensive activities is commonly seen as the 
main cause of rising global temperature. Banks and other lending financial institutions produce few 
hazardous chemicals or release toxic pollutants into the environment themselves. However, it has 
been increasingly recognized that banks are inextricably linked to commercial activity that harms the 
natural environment through their lending practices to businesses (Sarokin & Schulkin, 1991; Smith, 
1994; Gray & Bebbington, 2001). In other words, banks facilitate and enable industrial activity 
environmental damage when they support projects that do not meet environmental standards 




1.1.1 Development of Green Finance 
Since the early 1990s, financial institutions, governmental organizations, and NGOs have recognized 
the importance of sustainable development in solving the ever-growing environmental challenges. In 
May 1992, a small group of commercial banks, including Deutsche Bank, HSBC Holdings, Royal 
Bank of Canada, joined forces with the United Nations Environment Programme to issue the 
Statement by Banks on the Environment and Sustainable Development and to form the Banking 
Initiative (UNEP, 1992). The UNEP Financial Initiative publicly recognizes that sustainable 
development—development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs—must rank amongst the highest priorities of banks; and 
that banks need to be important contributors to sustainable development. Since then, the financial 
sector has striven to contribute to sustainable development. 
In 2003, the Equator Principles (EP) was launched to ensure that projects financed by banks be 
socially responsible and environmentally friendly. The EP serves as a baseline that calls on banks to 
consider environmental and social risks in their lending decisions when supporting new projects with 
a capital cost over USD 10 million, including advisory services, project finance, corporate loans, and 
bridge loans; and to decline projects that do not meet environmental and social standards (Equator 
Principles Association, 2013). The EP provides a guideline for banks in terms of responsive banking 
and brings responsibility out of the realm of multilateral development banks, such as the World Bank. 
Currently, 91 financial institutions across 37 countries have adopted the Equator Principles, 
representing over 70 percent of international Project Finance debt in emerging markets. The EP has 
the potential to influence a substantial number of projects given the number of participants, though it 
has received much criticism questioning its ability to deliver what it has pledged to do (i.e., enable 
more sustainable projects on the ground) (O’Sullivan & O’Dwyer 2009; Macve & Chen 2010).  
Some other remarkable green finance principles and projects include UN Global Compact (UNGC) 
and UN Principles for Responsible Investment. The UNGC contains ten voluntary principles in the 
areas of human rights, labour, environment, and anti-corruption. It asks businesses to take a 
precautionary approach to environmental challenges, promote environmental responsibility, and 
encourage the development of environment-friendly technologies (UNGC, n.d.). UN Principles for 
Responsible Investment include six voluntary and aspirational investment principles that introduce 
possible actions for incorporating ESG issues into investment practice. The Principles have 1,750 
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signatories from over 50 countries, representing approximately US$70 trillion investments (UNPRI, 
n.d.). 
Each of these initiatives has been signed by a group of banks. The initiatives help banks in 
increasing reputation, public recognition, and investors’ favours, but may also impose challenges on 
stricter standards and more transparency (Bal, Faure, & Liu, 2014).  
Green finance can also be used as a strategy by governments to help reduce ever-growing 
environmental problems. Referred as to the World’s Factory, China has experienced significant 
economic growth for several decades, benefitting since 1978 from the economic reforms. Tags, labels 
and stickers inscribed with “Made in China” can be seen everywhere in the world. Most companies in 
attempting to catch this fast train have paid less attention to society and the environment. Many of the 
world’s environmental problems, including water, land, and air pollution have been the tragic and 
very serious result of China’s economic success. As a solution to reducing such increasing 
environmental issues, the Chinese government has put a policy in place - the Green Credit Policy - to 
ensure that the economy grow in a healthy and sustainable manner.  
 
1.1.2 Green Finance in China 
In 2007, the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), the People's Bank of China 
(PBOC), and the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) published a joint policy – the 
Opinion on Implementing Environmental Regulations and Managing Credit Risks, which requires 
banks to allocate more resources towards encouraged industries; to constrain resources for restricted 
industries; and to withdraw support from prohibited industries. This policy is commonly known as 
‘the Green Credit Policy’. In response to this policy, banks have begun to offer green credit to 
environmental protection, emission reduction, and energy conservation projects, as well as limit loans 
to high-pollution, high-emission, and overcapacity (known as “two-high and one-over”) industries. 
Subsequently, some additional guidelines were put in place to support the development of the 
Green Credit Policy. In 2009, the China Banking Association issued Guidelines on corporate social 
responsibility, asking banks to take on environmental responsibility in supporting national industrial 
policies and environmental policies. The CBRC issued a formal document entitled the Green Credit 
Guideline in 2012. The guideline was formulated for the purpose of “encouraging banking institutions 
to, by focusing on green credit, actively adjust credit structures, effectively fend off environmental 
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and social risks, better serve the real economy, and boost the transformation of an economic growth 
mode and adjustment of economic structures” (CRBC, 2012). In 2014, the Chinese Banking 
Association along with 29 banks initiated a Green Finance Committee to organize activities such as 
developing a green bonds standard, facilitating environmental stress tests for the banking sector, and 
organizing discussions on greening China’s overseas investment. In December 2015 and January 
2016, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) and the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC) released their Green Bond Guidelines, respectively, making China the first country in the 
world to publish official rules for the issuance of green bonds. 
Since the beginning of the Green Credit Policy in 2007, green credit has been growing steadily in 
China. By the end of 2015, China’s financial institutions provided a total of 8.08 trillion RMB 
(approximately 1.24 trillion USD) in green credit. 21 major banks and financial institutions 
contributed 7.01 trillion RMB out of the total green credit, amounting to 9% of their total outstanding 
loan. During a press release in September 2016, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (2016) 
claimed that the balance of energy-saving and environment protection projects and services of the 21 
major banks’ non-performing loans was 22.625 billion, or 0.41% in terms of NPL ratio, 1.35 
percentage points lower than the NPL ratio of total loans. The CBRC (2016) also claimed that the 
overall quality of energy-saving and environment protection projects and services was excellent, and 
that these projects and services are saving 435 million tons of CO2 per year. 
Despite the many challenges that remain in the development of green finance, the Green Credit 
Policy in China has enabled many environment-friendly projects that might well have been previously 
denied by lenders. 
 
1.2 The Problem 
Green finance is a bridge which connects environmental industries to financial institutions (Salazar, 
1998). While the financial sector has taken much voluntary action, there remains a lack of loans for 
environment-friendly projects, such as renewable energy plants, waste treatment infrastructures, and 
green vehicles. Both society and the academic world are questioning green finance on its ability to 
deliver what it has pledged to do (i.e., enable more sustainable projects on the ground) (O’Sullivan & 
O’Dwyer 2009; Macve & Chen 2010). The research of this thesis takes on the question from here; 




1.3 Significance of the Problem 
The significance of the problem can be explained in three parts: 1) the lack of empirical studies in 
green finance; 2) the significance of China’s Green Credit Policy; and 3) researching green finance 
from the banks’ perspective. This study is expected to fill the knowledge gap of the problem. 
 
Lack of empirical studies in green finance 
Currently, there are many empirical studies regarding sustainability performance and financial 
performance. Many academic surveys have identified a positive correlation between environmental 
performance and financial performance from the corporate perspective (Dowell et al., 2000; Klassen 
& McLaughlin, 1996). Nakao et al. (2007) also found that there is a positive two-way interaction 
between environmental performance and financial performance in Japanese corporations, though 
neither studies from Margolis and Walsh (2001) or Wagner et al., (2001) show a clear positive 
correlation between sustainability performance and financial performance. Regardless of the results, 
these “Western” approaches often attempt to uncover whether better sustainability practices lead to 
better financial performance in returns, but these studies do not target the banking sector specifically. 
Even in practice, only a few banks have used quantitative indicators to integrate environmental 
risks into their credit risk management (Weber, 2012). In a survey conducted by Weber, Fenchel, and 
Scholz (2008), only 10 out of the 42 large banks in Europe have tried to assess environmental risks 
quantitatively for costing analysis, mainly due to the lack of suitable instruments and awareness of 
environmental risks in their portfolio. A similar study found only six banks that have integrated 
environmental risk out of a total of 114 banks (Furrer, Hamprecht, & Hoffmann, 2012). As a result, 
empirical studies in green finance can determine whether the correlation between sustainability 
performance and financial performance also exist in the banking sector. 
 
Significance of China’s Green Credit Policy 
China, to date, is the only country in the world to have organized green finance activities and 
standardized mandatory reporting on green loans for its banks. The Green Credit Policy is really the 
driving force of green finance in China. With a balance of 8.08 trillion RMB and a good number of 
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participants, the Green Credit Policy in China provides an excellent, practical example of green 
finance for an empirical study of green finance. In addition, another great characteristic of the Green 
Credit Policy is its standardization, as major Chinese banks have used the same guideline in providing 
green credit. In 2013, the CBRC identified the measuring standard for 12 types of environment-
friendly projects and services, as well as the evaluation system of the Green Credit Policy, making the 
banks’ results highly comparable. Any lesson learned from the implementation of China’s Green 
Credit Policy could be used as a valuable reference for other regulators and banks. 
In comparison, Western banks take different approaches to green finance. Western banks conduct 
green finance voluntarily, and the supervisory entities do not ask for mandatory participation in green 
finance. Unlike the Green Credit Policy in China, green finance lacks standardizations and developing 
mechanisms. For instance, green finance does not have a common definition among Western banks. 
The term is too broad and mixed with other terms (discussed in section 2.1). Principles such as 
UNEP, EP, and UNGC focus on developing the framework for green finance, but fail to promote the 
development of green finance.  
In practice, Western banks’ green finance activities are mostly driven by the decision-makers’ 
awareness of sustainable development and corporate social responsibility, whereas Chinese banks 
participate in green finance primarily because of regulatory requirements. Regardless of the 
motivation of the decision-makers, green finance in China has grown from almost none to 8.08 
trillion RMB in 2015. This rapid growth suggests that there must be some incentives that are 
motivating the banks to offer more green credit. 
 
Studying green finance from the banks’ perspective 
To date there are only a limited number of studies on green finance in China, with most of the 
research being attentive to the Green Credit Policy from the policymaker’s perspective. Moreover, the 
majority of these studies provide only a conceptual framework regarding the environmental risk 
management of commercial banks in managing and improving environmental risk (Cai, 2015; Hu & 
Cao, 2011; Wei, 2010). A quantitative study from Zhao (2015) tackled the Green Credit Policy from 
the macro level only (i.e. effect on the reduction of greenhouse gas emission). Although the Green 
Credit Policy mandates banks to provide green credit, the final executions are done by the banks 
themselves. Banks determine whether they are going to provide green credit to borrowers and how 
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much green credit they will allocate from their total loan based on their internal strategy. Therefore, 
the best way to tackle the problem is to examine green finance from the banks’ perspective. Only a 
few scholars have attempted to utilize “Western” approaches in analyzing the financial benefit of the 
Green Credit Policy in the Chinese banking sector. A recent study from Weber (2016) suggests that 
there is a correlation between financial performance indicators and sustainability performance in 
Chinese banks. The study by Weber (2016) recognizes the financial benefit from sustainability 
activities, but it does not confirm that there are financial incentives to be gained from green credit.  
 
Overall, this research thesis tries to fill the knowledge gap by conducting an empirical study of the 
financial incentives from green credit in China. The following section further breaks down the 
research questions and the objectives of the thesis. 
 
1.4 Research Questions and Objectives 
The research attempts to identify and examine the main incentives that encourage banks to provide 
more green credit. 
More specifically, the two sub-questions of this research are as follows: 
1. Are banks able to get new business opportunities with the development of green credit? 
2. How does green credit influence the risk management of the banks? 
 
The general objective of this research is to study the influence of green credit on financial 
performance from the banks’ perspective through the Green Credit Policy in China.  
The broad goal is to be accomplished by four specific objectives: 
1. Determining the underlying incentives of implementing green finance from the financing 
providers’ perspective; 
2. Measuring green credit activities of the major banks in China; 




4. Evaluating the strategic impact of green credit to financial institutions. 
 
1.5 Research Methodology 
This research uses the study from Weber et al. (2015) discussed in section 2.3 as a theoretical 
framework. Weber (2015) notes that banks integrate sustainable criteria into their lending business 
because of risk management (Weber, 2012) and of business opportunities in green-lending (Aizawa & 
Yang, 2010). To test whether these are the incentives for which banks conduct green finance, this 
study uses random-effects panel regression, Two-stage Least Square (2SLS) regression analysis, and 
corresponding tests to test the following hypotheses. 
Three hypotheses to be tested are: 
Hypothesis 1: Green credit is an expanding product or service that grows at a faster rate than total 
loans.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Allocating large shares of green credit to the loan portfolio reduces credit risk (i.e., 
NPL ratio of the bank). 
 
Hypothesis 3: Allocating large shares of loans to high-pollution, high-emission, and overcapacity 
industries to the loan portfolio increases credit risk (i.e., NPL ratio of the bank). 
 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis contains four main parts, followed by a conclusion: 
1) Literature Review 
This chapter reviews the literature on green finance and introduces the conceptual framework 
base on the literature. Some key studies are introduced to set up the stage for the statistical 
model. 
2) Current Development of Green Credit in China 
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This chapter starts with an introduction of the banking system in China and the Green Credit 
policy followed by an analysis of the current development of green finance in China. Literature 
regarding the Green Credit Policy is also reviewed in this chapter. 
3) Research Methodologies and Models 
This chapter introduces the data collection process and design of the quantitative models. 
Quantitative methodologies and the corresponding tests used in this paper are explained. 
4) Results and Findings 









The theoretical background of the statistical study is explained in this chapter. This chapter defines 
the boundary of the research and clarifies the terms used in this research. The literature regarding 
green finance is reviewed and applied to this empirical study. Furthermore, the literature that helps 
build the quantitative models is reviewed. This chapter concludes with a detailed explanation of the 
conceptual framework. 
 
2.1 Defining Green Finance, Sustainable Banking, and Green Credit 
Today, the term ‘green finance’ appears in many studies. However, there is no universal definition of 
green finance and its related terms. This section reviews the definition of ‘Green Finance’, 
‘Sustainable Banking’, and ‘Green Credit’ from the literature, summarizes the commonly accepted 
elements in these definitions, and then clarifies the definition of these terms used in this research.  
 
Green finance 
The definition of green finance varies among the different studies. Some literature even 
interchanges the term green finance with similar terms. Meanwhile, a few core elements have been 
commonly accepted.  
Höhne et al. (2012) suggest that “green finance is a broad term that can refer to financial 
investments flowing into sustainable development projects and initiatives, environmental products, 
and policies that encourage the development of a more sustainable economy”. These financial 
investments may be related to greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) reduction, industrial pollution 
control, or biodiversity protection. 
Similarly, PricewaterhouseCoopers Consultants (PWC) (2013) define green finance as “financial 
products and services, under the consideration of environmental factors throughout the lending 
decision making, ex-post monitoring and risk management processes, provided to promote 
 
11 
environmentally responsible investments and stimulate low-carbon technologies, projects, industries 
and businesses”. 
Lindenberg (2014) suggests that green finance comprises: 1) financing of green investments in 
environmental goods and services and prevention of damages to the environment and to the climate; 
2) financing of public green policies that encourage the implementation of environmental projects and 
initiatives; and 3) green financial system that deals especially with green investments. 
In general, most studies agree that green finance is a kind of financial product or service for 
sustainable development projects and environmentally responsible investments. It is indeed a broad 
term that includes all forms of investment or lending related to sustainable development projects. The 
real challenge is to set boundaries in green investments and projects (i.e., what is considered as 
sustainable development projects or environmentally responsible investments, and what is not). 
 
Sustainable banking  
In general, sustainable banking is the integration of sustainable development into the banking 
sector. The idea of sustainable development was first introduced by Brundtland in 1987. It is defined 
as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs”. Sustainable banking is referred to as the strategy for achieving 
sustainable development of financial institutions. 
Jeucken (2001) identified four phases of action that banks take for sustainability. Sequentially, the 
phases are defensive banking, preventative banking, offensive banking, and sustainable banking 
















In the defensive phase, the bank stays inactive or even resists emerging environmental regulations, 
as its interests may be damaged directly or indirectly through its clients. The cost for environmental 
management can be avoided in this phase. 
In the preventative phase, the bank merely integrates environmental risk management into its daily 
business, due to the potential for cost saving, driving force from governments and NGOs, and 
reputational risks. 
In the offensive phase, the bank recognizes environmental concerns as a competitive opportunity in 
the market. Banks will develop environment-related products or services that may address those 
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concerns, and attempt to market them to their clients. These products and services are designed to 
help reach a win-win solution; however, since environmental costs are not completely integrated into 
the price system, this could hardly be the case. 
The sustainable phase is the ideal stage of the bank. Jeucken describes this stage as, “the bank does 
not look for the highest financial rate of return, but for the highest sustainable rate of return, while 
being profitable in the long run.” Meanwhile, it contradicts with the goal of a business – optimizing 
its profits. This strategy will cost the bank profit in the short run, meaning that it will act against the 
interest of the shareholders. Jeucken believes that it can work only if all banks act on a similar basis. 
To achieve the sustainable phase, a bank should implement the idea of sustainability into its core 
values and long-term strategies. Therefore, instead of looking at green credit as a product or service, it 
should be integrated within the business. 
Sustainable banking is really about a bank’s sustainable development strategy, though the actual 
strategy may vary among different banks. Despite the fact that some of these ideas may be obsolete 
by today’s standards, the typology of banking and sustainable development still provides an effective 
theoretical framework for those financial institutions who are seeking long-term sustainable growth. 
The Green Credit Policy in China, for example, is designed to guide Chinese banks toward the 
sustainable phase.  
 
Green Credit 
Green Credit is frequently used in China. It refers to the actual green finance product and service 
offered by banks in China (i.e., loans related to environmental protection, emission reduction, and 
energy conservation projects). If green finance is considered as a solution to environmental problems 
and resource management (Wang, 2013; Li & Xia, 2014), then green credit is the actual bridge which 
connects the environmental industries with the financial institutions (Salazar, 1998). In some cases, 
the term is used interchangeably with the Green Credit Policy – a policy which encourages the banks 
to provide preferred/lower interest rates to environmental friend companies and cut down loans to 
polluting businesses. For the purposes of this thesis, the policy is always called the ‘Green Credit 
Policy’; and ‘green credit’ is used exclusively for from Chinese banks related to environmental 




Definition of terms used in this thesis 
The boundary of this research is limited to these three areas. In this thesis, ‘green finance’ is used 
as a broad term to represent all forms of investment or lending related to sustainable development 
projects and environmentally responsible investments. This includes not only investments and lending 
that flow into sustainable development projects, but also withdrawing from projects with high 
pollution rates. The term ‘sustainable banking’ refers to the sustainable development strategy 
employed by decision-makers. ‘Sustainable banking’ emphasizes on the strategy – long-term and 
sustainable growth, while ‘green finance’ is used to describe the actual activities. ‘Green credit’ refers 
solely to loans for environmental protection, emission reduction, and energy-saving projects in China. 
In addition, loans to “two-high and one-over” sectors refer to such loans to high-pollution, high-
emission, and overcapacity industries. The actual policy in China is termed the ‘Green Credit Policy’. 
 
2.2 Green Finance from the Banks’ Perspective 
In practice, decision-makers who acknowledge the importance of sustainable development are likely 
to engage in green finance activities. As suggested by Weber et al. (2015), banks apply sustainability 
criteria to their lending business for three reasons: 1) to manage their environmental risks (Weber, 
2012); 2) to have business opportunities from green-lending (Aizawa & Yang, 2010); and 3) to 
improve their own reputation (Nandy & Lodh, 2012). In addition, banks may also conduct green 
finance because of 4) compliance risk. The study from Weber et al. (2015) sets up a conceptual 
framework for the empirical studies (introduced in Section 2.5). These possible motivations are 
examined to determine whether they create financial incentives for banks to participate in green 
financing. 
 
2.2.1 Managing Environmental Risk 
Credit risk management is the key to ensuring the business success of a bank. Those lenders that can 
evaluate risks will be more likely to succeed in the banking industry (Hempel et al., 1990). Banks 
develop environmental and sustainability credit risk assessment policies and procedures (Evangelinos 
& Nikolaou, 2009), and use them as a mechanism to manage credit risks resulting from 
environmental, social, and sustainability impacts (Coulson & Monks, 1999; Weber & Banks, 2012). 
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Furthermore, some lenders integrate environmental risk management throughout the phases of their 
credit risk management such as rating, costing, pricing, monitoring, and work-out (Weber, Fenchel, & 
Scholz, 2008).  
 
Risk management 
The goal of every business is to make a profit and so, by extension, the goal of every strategy 
should be to move that business towards optimal profitability. Banks take deposits and channel the 
capital into lending activities. A commercial bank earns revenue from interest on outstanding loans 
and service charges, pays variable costs that include the cost of holding capital and the loss from bad 
debt as well as the various fixed costs associated with the provision of banking services. The 
simplified profit model of a bank can be expressed as a function of: 
Profit = Interest Income + Service Charges – Bad Debt – Capital Holding Costs – Fixed Costs   
While capital cost is largely influenced by the macroeconomic environment and fixed costs being 
stable, the ability to minimize bad debt is what can be managed to increase the profit of a bank. 
Typically, this requires the lenders to keep track of a borrower’s capital stock, earnings, liquidity, etc. 
Those factors are often recognized as counterparty credit risks which influence the borrower’s ability 
to repay the loan (i.e. the default risk of a borrower) (Saunders, 1999; Caouette et al., 1998; Fitch, 
1997). Recently, environmental risk is recognized as one of the most important factors that can 
influence credit risk. 
 
Environmental risk 
Sustainability performance is suggested to have a positive influence on future financial earnings 
(Aerts, Cormier, & Magnan, 2008; Weber, 2016). Some studies find a positive correlation between 
sustainability performance and borrowers’ credit risk (Bauer & Hann 2010; Goss & Roberts 2011; 
Weber, 2016). In general, banks are not interested in playing the role of environmental regulators 
(Coulson & Monks, 1999), or environmental policemen (Thompson, 1998). In practice, banks are 
more aware of environmental consequences of their lending decisions, as the environment in return 
can pose serious risks to a bank’s business. Per Thompson (1998), there are three types of 
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environmental risks resulting from a bank’s lending decisions – direct risk, indirect risk, and 
reputational risk. 
Direct risk occurs when a bank takes over possession of the land that was being used as collateral 
for a loan. When pollution has contaminated the land, the lender who has taken it as a security will 
find that the land has decreased in value. With increased legislation, the lender will also find himself 
being treated as the responsible party, hence resulting fin his being held liable for remediation costs 
(Dawson, 1996). These remediation costs can be substantial, even to the point of exceeding the 
original value of the loan (Case, 1996).  
Indirect risk emerges when environmental cost is incurred, thus impairing a borrower’s ability to 
repay the loan. A business may be exposed to many costs due to causing damage to the environment, 
such as the cost of cleaning up contaminated sites, the cost of complying with increased 
environmental legislation, and losing customers due to its bad reputation. Eventually, banks can be 
affected as well when the business is not able to pay back its loans. In such a series of events, this 
type of risk could end up with a bank losing its loans. 
Lastly is reputational risk. A bank’s lending to environmentally irresponsible companies might 
infuse reputational risk when receiving negative comments from the public, such as customers, 
media, pressure groups, and governmental bodies (Buxton, 1997). Reputational risk is considered 
different from the other two risks by Thompson (1998), as it might hurt banks over a long period of 
time rather than from sudden losses. Banks may lose their ability to attract new customers, lose 
interest from investors, and eventually suffer financial loss. Thus, it is more difficult to gauge its 
financial consequences. 
These three types of risk may co-exist to create a serious burden on a bank. As such, it gives banks 
plenty of reason to consider environmental issues in their lending decisions. Fear of losing their loans 
(indirect risk) and getting a bad reputation (reputational risk) as well as being held responsible for the 
clean-up of the contaminated site(s) (direct risk) are the main reason why banks take environmental 
information into consideration before making the final lending decision. Thompson and Cowton 
(2004) stated that “the consideration of environmental issues in bank lending operations is prompted 
mainly by a concern to manage risk rather than to exploit lending opportunities or as a means of 
fulfilling their social responsibilities”. They argued that “banks are not so much interested in the 
impact of bank lending upon the environment as in the impact of the environment (as filtered by 
regulators, etc.) upon bank lending.” 
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2.2.2 Business Opportunities 
A bank’s fundamental goal is to achieve optimal profits. Green credit is a service that targets 
businesses in the environment-friendly sector. Many financial services and products have been 
developed by a rapidly evolving banking sector to serve the needs of specific groups of customers. 
Banks are now seeing green entrepreneurs as a target group to whom they can expand their market. 
And, with incentives from the government, businesses are seeing the case for the environment-
friendly sector (Aizawa & Yang, 2010; Wei, 2009). Aizawa and Yang (2010) mentioned that “banks 
in developed and developing markets are becoming increasingly interested in financing energy-
efficiency and renewable-energy projects, and to become involved in carbon financing, in a concerted 
effort to address climate change and make profits, a win-win scenario”. 
Management and marketing theories may explain how and why banks adopt sustainability. The 
first-mover advantage (FMA) means a financial benefit for the business that first adopts a strategy. 
This is also valid for the financial sector (Weber, 2014b).  
Meanwhile, the question regarding the priority between new opportunities and risk controls has 
been controversial. Fulton (2008) believes that environmental problems come behind profits –  the 
fundamental interests of a bank, so the incentives and subsidies from the government are very 
important in the development of green credit. However, Thompson (1998) argues that although 
considering environmental issues in the business world offers banks opportunities (green market) for 
gaining financial benefits, banks focus more on risks than possible profits. Businesses often try to 
weigh the trade-off between financial return and sustainability (Delmas et al., 2010; Hahn et al., 2010; 
Keele & DeHart, 2011) rather than seeing a win–win situation in both (Schaltegger & Wagner, 2011). 
 
2.2.3 Improving Reputation 
Banks also conduct green finance in hopes of increasing their reputation. As mentioned before, banks 
try to improve reputation through sustainable banking with the goal of reducing reputational risk 
(Thompson, 1998). Some scholars suggest that reputational risk could affect the financial 
performance of a bank (Scholtens et al., 2008). Much reputational risk can come from the 
stakeholders. Stakeholders are becoming more aware of the need for sustainable development and 
often put pressure on the organization. For example, due to reputational risk, banks started to 
investigate their financed emissions after NGOs, such as Banktrack and Rainforest Action Network, 
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started to track emissions caused by the banks’ loans to their clients. However, banks are often 
criticized for being reactive rather than proactive regarding sustainable development (Weber, 2014b). 
In addition, Simpson and Kohers (2002) found a positive correlation between corporate social 
responsibility and financial performance in the financial sector. Similarly, Anderson and Sullivan 
(1993) found that customer satisfaction could generate customer loyalty, which effectively helps the 
banks to expand their business in a cost beneficial way. Weber (2016) also found a causal correlation 
between CSR performance and financial performance in Chinese banks. Banks also attempt to 
increase their reputation by reducing the direct environmental impact from their daily operations 
(Babiak & Trendafilova, 2011), though the direct environmental impact is relatively small for service 
sectors like the banking industry. 
Corporation reputation is recognized as a company’s intangible asset. This research will not 
attempt to analyze the effect of reputation due to toughness and lack of inaccuracy in quantifying the 
value of reputation.  
 
2.2.4 Compliance risk 
The Basel Committee defines compliance risk as “the risk of legal or regulatory sanctions, material 
financial loss, or loss to reputation a bank may suffer as a result of its failure to comply with laws, 
regulations, rules, related self-regulatory organization standards, and codes of conduct applicable to 
its banking activities” (Basel Committee, 2005). Basel III, for example, has increased the core tier one 
capital ratio from 2% to 4.5%, and requires banks to further increase the ratio to 7% by 2019. Banks 
whose core tier one capital ratio falls within the buffer zone (4.5% to 7%) will face restrictions on 
paying dividends and discretionary bonuses. As a result, being compliant with environmental policies 
has also become very important to financial institutions. For instance, Chinese banks are increasing 
their green credit to be compliant with the Green Credit Policy.  
Managing compliance risk is about dealing with future regulations. Non-compliance usually does 
not cause immediate losses. Most regulations, laws, and standards provide a transition period for 
corporations. Nevertheless, if no action is taken ahead of time, transitions are much harder to achieve 




Moreover, corporate compliance risk can also affect financial institutions indirectly. Businesses 
that have failed to comply with environmental regulations may suffer financial loss, thus negatively 
influencing the ability to repay their loans. Therefore, financial institutions should apply sustainability 
criteria in their lending decisions. 
Compliance risk is not studied in this research as the effect of this type of risk is mostly reflected in 
future financial performances. 
 
To summarize, it is not hard to find that the reason for conducting green finance is interconnected. 
Implementing green finance helps banks to better manage their environmental risk and compliance 
risk, thus improving their reputation and eventually helping to expand their business. 
 
2.3 Application of green finance literature to China 
Theoretically, the literature from section 2.2 can also be applicable to China. Chinese banks should 
conduct green finance activities for the following four reasons. 
First, Chinese banks, in providing more green credit, are being compliant with the Green Credit 
Policy. Currently, the Green Credit Policy does not set a quota on the amount of green credit a bank 
should supply, but there is no telling whether the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) 
will set stricter standards in the future. The CBRC has been asking banks to report their key 
performance indicators (KPI) on green credit since 2014. This might indicate that the CBRC will 
require that banks meet certain performance standards. Forward thinking decision-makers would be 
wise to make early moves towards managing potential risks in the future. 
Nevertheless, compliance risk is not the only reason why Chinese banks should engage in green 
finance activities. In China, there is a large demand for curbing pollution and energy consumption 
(Aizawa & Yang, 2010), and building corresponding infrastructures would require a significant 
amount of funding. Many banks are seeing these business opportunities and trying to grow their 
business by financing these developments. Taking advantage of these opportunities can eventually 
enhance the financial performance of the banks through the increase in interest income. 
With the Chinese central government striving for sustainable economic growth, high-pollution, 
high-emission, and overcapacity (“two-high and one-over”) projects are exposed to environmental 
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risks. Meanwhile, environment-friendly projects have very limited exposure to environmental risks. 
As a result, Chinese banks are shifting their loans from “two-high and one-over” industries to 
environment-friendly industries to reduce the environmental risk in their loan portfolios. 
Finally, many Chinese banks are attempting to grow their business globally. As a result, they may 
find that corporation reputation is very important in becoming successful worldwide. Customers pay 
close attention to a business’ reputation when dealing with it for the first time. 
Overall, theories from previous studies have advanced the possible incentives that encourage banks 
to provide more green credit and fewer loans to “two-high and one-over” industries. These possible 
incentives are justified by the quantitative models. 
 
2.4 Non-Performing Loan (NPL) and NPL Ratio 
To help build the quantitative models, the literature regarding credit risk is reviewed here. Credit risk 
is the risk of default on a debt due to the borrower’s non-payment of the principal or interest on the 
loan. There are many theoretical models of credit risk measurement, but these models often only 
focus on the measuring or estimating. For the nature of this study, an explanatory model is used.  
Non-performing loan (NPL) and NPL ratio, on the other hand, are good indicators of how much 
risk a bank takes at a specific moment. A non-performing loan refers to a loan in which the debtor 
fails to make scheduled payments for at least 90 days. An NPL is either in default or close to being in 
default of repayment. Typically, once a loan is considered non-performing, the odds that it will be 
repaid in full are substantially low. The NPL ratio is the amount of non-performing loans over total 
loans, expressed as a percentage. It is a good indicator of how well a bank manages its default risk.  
Many scholars have tried to investigate the determinants of NPLs, and some have found that in fact 
both macroeconomic and bank-specific determinants can affect the NPL ratio of a bank (Ghosh, 
2015; Klein, 2013). 
 
Macroeconomic factors (systematic risks) 
In fact, most empirical studies examine NPLs from a macroeconomic perspective, despite the fact 
that systemic credit risk represents about half of the total bank credit risk (Li & Zinna, 2014). NPLs 
of banks in Central, Eastern, and South-Eastern Europe (CESEE) were found to respond to 
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macroeconomic conditions, such as GDP growth, unemployment, and inflation in the period of 1998–
2011 (Klein, 2013). Also from banks in CESEE, Jakubik and Reininger (2013) confirmed that 
domestic economic activities, stock indices, and currency exchanges can have a sizeable impact on 
NPL ratio. NPLs are highly sensitive to real interest rates and unemployment rates according to the 
Nordic banking system (Berge & Boye, 2007). Quagliarello (2007) found that NPLs of Italian banks 
were affected by the business cycle over the period of 1985 to 2002.  
As all Chinese banks operate under a similar macroeconomic environment (except for some local 
influences), this study does not implement macroeconomic factors. 
 
Bank-specific factors (unsystematic risks) 
Most of the literature on bank-specific determinants follow in the footsteps of Berger and DeYoung 
(1997). This strand of literature examines the distinctive features and the policy choices of each bank 
to find the factors that influence NPLs of banks. These factors are generally endogenous since they 
are often related to the management quality of a bank. 
In their seminal paper, Berger and DeYoung (1997) drew attention to the links among problem 
loans, cost efficiency, and financial capital. They investigated four hypotheses from a sample of US 
commercial banks between 1985 to 1994: 
‘Bad luck’ hypothesis: External events cause an increasing number of NPLs. External events, such 
as a local plant closing, can create problem loans for banks. Therefore, banks are supposed to make 
additional managerial effort and expense to deal with problem loans. This hypothesis was supported 
by the data – increases in NPLs are typically followed by decreases in cost efficiency, suggesting that 
banks are forced to increase spending on monitoring and selling off of these loans. 
‘Bad management’ hypothesis: NPL is negatively associated with cost efficiency. The justification 
is that subpar managers have poor skills in credit scoring, appraisal of collaterals pledged against the 
loans, and monitoring covenants. Moreover, managers in these banks do not keep their operating 
expenses under control. 
‘Skimping’ hypothesis: Increases in measured cost efficiency generally precede increases in non-
performing loans. Under this hypothesis, there is a trade-off between short-term operating costs and 
future loan performances. Allocating more resources to screening loan applicants, appraising pledged 
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collateral, and monitoring loans after issuance ensure better loan performance in the future, but 
impose more costs in the short run. Conversely, reducing effort to monitoring loans saves operating 
costs in the short run, but may increase the risk of running into loan performance problems. 
‘Moral hazard’ hypothesis: Banks with low capital ratios generally have more non-performing 
loans. Under this hypothesis, bank managers with incentive contracts attempt to increase performance 
by taking riskier loans. It is a classic problem when one party gets involved in a risky event knowing 
that the other party will incur the cost. 
It is worth noting that Berger and De Young (1997) employed Granger-causality analysis to all four 
hypotheses, suggesting there are intertemporal relationships among problem loans, cost efficiency, 
and financial capital. They also suggest that each of these results has a relatively small effect on 
banks, but may have a substantial effect when all four hypotheses affecting the same bank at the same 
time. 
Louzis et al. (2012) extended Berger and DeYoung’s study by incorporating several additional 
hypotheses in their study of NPLs in the Greek banking sector. Their study confirmed ‘bad 
management’ (as well as ‘bad management II’), but rejected ‘skimping’ and ‘moral hazard’. In 
addition, they also found that: 1) increase in sovereign debt causes NPLs to rise; 2) large banks take 
excessive risks under the presumption of ‘too-big-to-fail’; therefore, larger banks have more NPLs; 
and, 3) performance outcome is negatively related to increases in future NPLs. 
In a study of US banks, Ghosh (2015) built his research on Berger and DeYoung’s (1997) and 
Louzis et al.’s (2010) studies, as well as others. The results from Ghosh’s (2015) study confirmed the 
‘bad management’, ‘skimping’, ‘moral hazard’, and ‘too big to fail’ hypotheses from these previous 
studies. In addition, he found that: 1) ensuring better quality credit and reducing illiquid loans in 
banks’ asset portfolios will reduce NPLs; and, 2) high profits will lead to more prudent lending. In 
addition, the lack of significance of bank diversification in the US banking industry matches that of 
the Greek banking industry (Louizis et al., 2012). 
In another strand of study, Micco and Panizza (2004) found that public banks are exposed to more 
risk than other banks since they play an important role in the facilitation of credit policies. Similarly, 
the case of Tunisia also showed that public ownership increases banks’ credit risk (Zribi & 
Boujelbène, 2011). De Nicolo (2001) and Iannotta et al. (2007) have suggested that state-owned 
banks typically exhibit higher risk than do other types of banks.  
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2.5 Conceptual Framework 
The degree of participation in green finance is really management’s decision. According to Koch et 
al. (2014), the decision-making from a bank’s perspective involves managing: 1) bank performance; 
2) securities and interest rate risks; 3) liquidity & capital; 4) loans & credit; and, 5) investments, 
globalization, & technology. The purpose of this study is to examine whether the commitment in 
green finance can achieve the expected outcome for the decision-makers. 
The conceptual framework (Figure 2.2) is built based on the study from Weber et al. (2015). As 
mentioned in Section 2.2, banks engage in green finance because of: 1) credit risk management 
(Weber, 2012); 2) new business opportunities (Aizawa & Yang, 2010); 3) corporate reputation 
(Nandy & Lodh, 2012); and, 4) compliance risk. This study only focuses on the first two incentives, 
as the other two cannot be measured directly. 
 






When a bank seeks better financial performance, one of the best ways is to provide more loans 
without having excessive leverage. Historically, banks have developed many products, such as credit 
cards, personal mortgage loans, etc., to generate more profits. Much of the literature suggests that 
green finance may bring new business opportunities (Aizawa & Yang, 2010; Weber, 2014b). Test 1 
essentially examines whether green credit is a rapidly growing product or service that expands faster 
than other types of products. It would be hard to assume that the growth from green credit would have 
a large impact on the profitability of the entire organization as banks also rely on other sources of 
income (i.e., non-interest incomes). Moreover, green credit only represents a low fraction of the total 
loans. 
Therefore, the first hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Green credit is an expanding product or service that grows at a faster rate than total 
loans. 
 
As suggested by Thompson and Cowton (2004), the consideration of environmental issues is 
mainly motivated by the concern of risk management. In addition, some scholars find a correlation 
between sustainability performance and credit risks of borrowers (Bauer & Hann, 2010; Goss & 
Roberts, 2011). This study attempts to study whether the incentive of offering more green credit 
exists (Test 2), and whether a bank will have more default risk when taking too much high-polluting, 
high-emission, and overcapacity projects (Test 3). 
This concept translates into the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2: Allocating large shares of green credit to the loan portfolio reduces credit risk (i.e., 
NPL ratio of the bank). 
Hypothesis 3: Allocating large shares of loans to high-pollution, high-emission, and overcapacity 
industries to the loan portfolio increases credit risk (i.e., NPL ratio of the bank). 
 





Current Development of Green Credit in China 
 
This chapter introduces the current development of green finance in China to help better understand 
the background of this empirical study. This chapter begins with an introduction of the Chinese 
banking system. A summary of major Green Credit Policies and an explanation of Green Credit 
products and services are provided, followed by a description of the current development of Green 
Credit in China. Additional literature regarding the Green Credit Policy is reviewed at the end of the 
chapter. 
 
3.1 Banking System in China 
Chinese banks play a very important role in the global financial industry. The “big four” state-owned 
commercial banks ICBC, BOC, CCB, and ABC are among the largest banks in the world. 
Nonetheless, there are many difference between banking industry in Western countries and banking 
industry in China. For example, the government and supervisory entities play important roles in 
China’s banking industry. Therefore, the general background of the Chinese banking sector, 
especially the political background, is provided to ensure better understanding of China’s Green 
Credit Policy. 
 
3.1.1 History of the Banking Industry in China 
In 1948, the People’s Bank of China was established and given sole representation of the nation’s 
financial assets. Since then, China’s financial system entered the era referred to as the “grand 
unification” (i.e., the PBOC worked as the central bank, the ministry of finance, and as commercial 
banks towards the country’s national goal within the planned economy).  
The “grand unification’ lasted until 1978 when the Chinese banking system started to 
commercialize after the Economic Reform. The process began in 1979 and was mostly completed in 
the late 1990s. In 1984, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) became the spin-off of 
the commercial service of the PBOC. The PBOC no longer provided corporate and personal services 
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from that point. From the mid-1980s, the existing BOC, CCB, and ABC transformed into commercial 
banks to serve foreign business, infrastructure investment, and the agriculture industry, respectively. 
The ABC, BOC, CCB, and ICBC are referred to as the “big four”. In the mid-1980s, joint-stock 
commercial banks began to surface with the Bank of Communications becoming the first joint-stock 
commercial bank in 1987. The China Merchant Bank was established by the China Merchant Group 
soon afterwards.  
The government made a second wave of reform to the financial system in the 1990s. National joint-
stock commercial banks were established by the government to offer banking services to households 
and firms across the nation. Unlike state-owned banks, which were fully owned by the State at that 
time, SOEs were the majority shareholders in joint-stock banks (Jia, 2009). In 1994, three policy 
banks were established to accomplish political missions. The China Development Bank was 
established to help develop infrastructure; the Export-Import Bank of China took over the policy 
business of international business; and the Agricultural Development Bank of China took over the 
policy business of rural finance. In addition, part of the reform was to create four state-owned asset 
management companies to tackle the problem of the accumulating non-performing loans from state-
owned banks. Many SOEs were on the verge of bankruptcy due to their lack of competitiveness after 
the economic transformation. As a result, state-owned banks had to absorb large amounts of non-
performing loans, and 1.4 trillion RMB of non-performing loans were eventually transferred to asset 
management. 
A third wave of financial reforms took place in the late 1990s. Foreign banks were permitted to 
operate in China and acquire up to a 25% stake in joint-stock banks. Both state-owned and joint-stock 
banks could file for initial public offerings (IPOs). By the end of 2015, 33 banks were publicly listed 
in mainland China, Hong Kong, or co-listed on both. City commercial banks and rural commercial 
banks were transformed from local credit unions. Many city credit unions were established from the 
late-1970s to 1993. The government decided to reorganize the system and to set up city commercial 
banks based on credit unions. There were over 5000 city credit unions, some of which were 
eventually closed, with the remaining 2000 credit unions becoming city commercial banks. Up until 
the end of 2009, there were 140 city commercial banks. Rural commercial banks were also developed 
in the same way. 
By the end of 2015, the Chinese banking system was composed of the PBOC, three policy banks, 
six state-owned banks (including the Postal Savings Bank of China), 12 joint-stock commercial 
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banks, more than 100 city commercial banks, and many rural commercial banks and rural credit 
unions.  
During the 30 years of reformation, the State gradually took a step back from allowing public 
ownership in all banks. As a result, financial institutions are more vulnerable to the discipline of the 
marketplace in the conduct of their business. Risk management is becoming more important to banks 
with the increase of public exposure and market competition, as both investors and depositors focus 
more on a bank’s risk profile when making their decisions (Wu & Bowe, 2012). 
 
3.1.2 Supervisory Entities 
The People's Bank of China (PBOC) and the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) are the 
two supervisory entities that oversee financial institutions in China. The structure of the Chinese 
Banking Industry is illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
The PBOC is China’s central bank, which formulates and implements monetary policy. The PBOC 
also maintains the banking sector's payments, clearing and settlement systems, and monitors official 
foreign exchange and gold reserves. It is also the issuer of the Renminbi – the official currency in 
China.  
Triggered by the accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was established to act as the independent banking regulator of 
China. The CBRC formulates supervisory rules and regulations that governs all banking institutions. 
As the supervisor of the banking industry, the CBRC focuses on conducting consolidated supervision 
to monitor and mitigate the risks of each banking institution. At the same time, the CBRC also strives 
to protect the interests of consumers, promote financial stability, and maintain market confidence 








Figure 3.1: Structure of Chinese Banking Industry
 
 
3.1.3 Government’s Influence on Commercial Banks 
As mentioned before, state-owned banks were commercialized to serve the financial needs of the 
people. All the traditional state-owned commercial banks and the Postal Savings Bank of China were 
once entirely owned by the government. Although all the state-owned banks went public, State and 
state-owned entities still own a large percentage of the total shares in these banks. State and state-
owned entities have the majority of shares/controlling interest (over 50%) in ABC, BOC, CCB, and 
ICBC (Table 3.1). Although the State does not have controlling interest in BOCOM, the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF), which represents the State, is still the largest shareholder of the bank. Moreover, 
State or state-owned shareholders control 100% of the policy banks. Having majority shares means 
the banks may act in the best interest of the country – the major shareholders of the company.  
Some scholars suggest that the lending policies and practices of state-owned commercial banks 
may potentially be an extension of the country’s overall social policy to help achieve its main 
economic agenda (Lardy, 2008; Zhang et al., 2011). In other words, state-owned banks may be very 

























Table 3.1: Major State or State-Owned Shareholders in State-Owned Commercial Banks 




ABC 1. Central Huijin Investment Ltd. 
2. Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
3. Social Security Fund (SSF) 
4. China Securities Finance Co., Ltd. 
5. Central Huijin Asset Management Co., Ltd. 








BOC 1. Central Huijin Investment Ltd. 
2. China Securities Finance Co., Ltd. 
3. Central Huijin Asset Management Co., Ltd. 
4. Wutongshu Investment Platform Ltd. 







BOCOM 1. MOF 
2. Social Security Fund (SSF) 
3. China Securities Finance Co., Ltd. 
4. Capital Airports Holding Company 
5. Shanghai Haiyan Investment Management 
6. Wutongshu Investment Platform Ltd. 









CCB 1. Central Huijin Investment Ltd. 
2. China Securities Finance Co., Ltd. 
3. Baosteel Group 
4. State Grid 







ICBC 1. Central Huijin Investment Ltd. 
2. Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
3. China Securities Finance Co., Ltd. 
4. Wutongshu Investment Platform Co., Ltd. 









To further break down the ownership, some of the key shareholders that make multiple 
appearances are introduced. 
Central Huijin Investment Ltd. (Huijin) is a wholly state-owned subsidiary of China Investment 
Corporation Limited. Huijin was founded to hold equity interests in state-owned financial institutions 
in accordance with the Chinese State Council, and to exercise its legal rights and assume obligations 
as an investor on behalf of the PRC Government. Huijin was established to achieve the goal of 
preserving and increasing the value of state-owned financial assets. Hui also does not engage in other 
commercial activities or operations of the company in which it invests. 
Some of the other state-owned enterprises, such as the Social Security Fund (SSF), China 
Securities Finance Co., and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) are all established to serve their own 
purpose, literally. By contrast, Wutongshu Investment Platform Ltd. is entirely owned by the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). 
 
Table 3.2: Companies Directly Held by Huijin 
No.  Company name Huijin’s shareholding 
percentage (%) 
1 China Development Bank Corporation 34.68% 
2 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited 34.71% 
3 Agricultural Bank of China Limited 40.03% 
4 Bank of China Limited 64.02% 
5 China Construction Bank Corporation 57.11% 
6 China Everbright Group Ltd. 55.67% 
7 China Everbright Bank Company Limited 21.96% 
8 China Export & Credit Insurance Corporation 73.63% 
9 China Reinsurance (Group) Corporation 71.56% 
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10 New China Life Insurance Company Limited 31.34% 
11 China Jianyin Investment Limited 100% 
12 China Galaxy Financial Holdings Company Limited 78.57% 
13 Shenwan Hongyuan Group Co., Ltd. 25.03% 
14 China International Capital Corporation Limited 28.45% 
15 China Securities Co., Ltd. 40.00% 
16 China Investment Securities Co., Ltd. 100% 
17 Jiantou CITIC Asset Management Co., Ltd. 70.00% 
18 Guotai Junan Investment Management Co., Ltd. 14.54% 
19 Central Huijin Asset Management Co., Ltd. 100% 
 
Three policy banks, ADBC, CDB, and EIBC were established to take over government-directed 
spending from the four state-owned commercial banks. These banks are responsible for their designed 
purposes, respectively. ADBC provides funds for agricultural development in rural areas; CDB 
specializes in infrastructure financing, and EIBC specializes in trade financing and development. 
By contrast, national joint-stock commercial banks may be owned by entities of a different nature. 
The major shareholders and their ownership structures also vary. For example, China Merchants Bank 
(CMB) has China Merchants Group as their largest shareholder (26.78%); China CITIC Bank has 
CITIC Group as their largest shareholder (67.13%); and China Industrial Bank has Fujian Provincial 
Department of Finance as their largest shareholder (17.86%). Nevertheless, most of the major 
shareholders are also state-owned enterprises (SOEs), such as regional governments, financial 
investment companies, and development companies, though these SOEs are typically less directly 
influenced by the government. 
City commercial banks and rural commercial banks focus more on regional development. City 
commercial banks can be found in better developed regions and provide funds for development in 
cities. Rural commercial banks are established in rural areas and specialize in rural development. 
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Typically, the top 10 shareholders of both city and rural commercial banks are corporation-
established by their corresponding governments.  
Overall, the government of PRC has ownership in almost all the commercial banks through 
different forms. The State and state-owned shareholders (mostly SOEs) own a 100% share of the 
policy banks, the majority interest in state-owned commercial banks and national joint-stock banks, 
and non-controlling interest in city commercial banks. The difference between state-owned banks and 
national joint-stock banks is that the State has more shares in state-owned banks while state-owned 
shareholders have more shares in national joint-stock banks. With State and state-owned shareholders 
having controlling interest, banks are more likely to obey government strategy and instruction to act 
in the State’s best interest. For instance, the type of banks with more State or state-owned 
shareholders has a greater proportion of green credit to total loans than those with less (Table 3.3). 
State-owned banks have a greater proportion of green credit than national joint-stock banks because 
national joint-stock banks have more SOEs as shareholders. Even though SOEs are owned by the 
State, they still function as normal businesses which generate profit. The State’s interest may come in 
second place.  
 
Table 3.3: Average Proportion of Green Credit Sorted by Type of Bank (with estimation) 
Year Policy State-owned National joint-
stock 
City 
2009 8.95% 4.12% 1.60% 1.09% 
2010 10.99% 4.02% 1.84% 1.15% 
2011 11.91% 4.25% 2.04% 1.27% 
2012 13.17% 4.10% 3.84% 1.58% 
2013 12.51% 4.95% 4.03% 1.70% 
2014 18.08% 4.98% 4.61% 2.24% 





3.2 Major Green Credit Policies 
Table 3.4 summarizes a list of major macroeconomic policies in green finance in China. In 1995, the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People's Republic of China (MEP), formerly the State 
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), and the PBOC issued policies respectively 
regarding credit policy for environment protection, providing a foundation for the Green Credit 
Policy. Since then, there has been many major events in the development of the Green Credit Policy. 
In 2005, the State Council took the idea further and integrated sustainable economic development 
into the development strategy of the nation. The Green Credit Policy was officially announced in 
2007. Subsequently, the SEPA, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the China Banking 
Association (CBA), and the CBRC issued guidelines respectively to provide sound practice and 
guidance. In 2012, the Guidelines on Green Credit was issued by CBRC, representing another 
milestone in the development of the Policy. The Guidelines defined banks’ roles and responsibilities 
in environmental protection and sustainable social and economic development and required 
full disclosure of Green Credit information. Recently, the PBOC and NDRC issued guidelines for 
green bonds, providing a routine for the development of green bonds. 
The Green Credit Policy requires banks to shift loans away from high-pollution, high-emission, and 
overcapacity industries to environmental protection, emission reduction, and energy saving industries. 
The Policy can be broken down into three components. First, financial institutions are required to take 
borrowers’ environmental performance into consideration before extending loans or granting new 
loans. Furthermore, banks should restrict or even take back loans from those enterprises in violation 
of environmental law. Second, the Green Credit Policy attempts to create environmental information 
sharing platform between financial institutions and environmental authorities. Information regarding 
environmental violators are shared between banks and environmental authorities, so that both parties 
can better monitor the environmental performance of borrowers/polluters. Third, banks are hold 
responsible for environmental violations. Sanctions will be imposed on financial institutions if they 
grant loans to polluting enterprises or environmental violators. Overall, the goal of this policy is to 






Table 3.4: Macroeconomic Policies in Green Finance 
Time Policy Department Remark 
February 1995 Notice on using credit policy 
in environment protection 
SEPA Foundation of the Green 
Credit Policy  
February 1995 Notice on implementing credit 
policy with environment 
protection 
PBOC Foundation of the Green 
Credit Policy 
December 2005 Decision on implementing 
Scientific Outlook on 
Development and improving 
environment protection 
State Council Integrated sustainable 
development into national 
development policies 
July 2007 Opinions on preventing credit 
risks and implementing policy 





The official issuance of the 
Green Credit Policy 




Introduced Equator Principal 
in China 
January 2009 Guidelines on corporate social 
responsibility for Chinese 
banking sector 
CBA Took environmental 
responsibility in supporting 
national industrial policies 
and environmental policies 
February 2012 Guidelines on Green Credit CBRC Defined banks’ roles in 
environmental protection 
and sustainable development 
and required full disclosure 
of Green Credit information 
June 2014 Notice of the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission on 
Key Performance Indicators of 
Green Credit Implementation 
CBRC Required banks to conduct 
self-assessment in green 
credit implementation and 





Green Bond Guidelines PBOC 
NDRC 
Issued by both departments 
separately 
 
3.3 Types of Green Credit 
Currently, there are many types of Green Credit offered by banks. In the “Notice of the China 
Banking Regulatory Commission on Key Performance Indicators of Green Credit Implementation”, 
the CBRC categorizes Green Credit into two general types – “Credit to projects and services of 
environmental protection and emission reduction” and “Credit to emerging strategic industries of 
energy saving & environmental protection, and new energy, new energy automobile” (CBRC, 2014), 
separating existing technologies and emerging technologies. However, banks often introduce more 
detailed products and services to meet the specific demands of their customers. The actual 
classification of Green Credit products varies among banks. Shanghai Pudong Development Banks, 
for example, has a comprehensive list of their offering in Green Credit products and services (Table 
3.5). 
 
Table 3.5: Types of Green Credit Products and Services Offered by Shanghai Pudong 
Development Bank (SPD, 2016) 
Number Categories Sub-Categories 
1 Green agricultural projects  
2 Green forestry projects  
3 Industrial energy and water 
conservation and environmental 
protection projects 
 
4 Nature protection, ecological 





5 Resource recycling projects  
6 Waste disposal and pollution 
prevention and treatment projects 
 
7 Renewable and clean energy sources 
projects 
1. Solar power projects 
2. Wind power projects 
3. Biomass power generation projects 
4. Hydroelectric projects 
5. Other renewable and clean energy sources 
projects 
6. Smart electrical grid projects 
8 Rural and urban water projects 1. Rural drinking water safety engineering 
projects 
2. Small-scale irrigation and water 
conservation facility construction projects 
3. Urban water conservation projects 
9 Energy-saving or green-building 
construction projects 
1. Green transformation of existing building 
projects  
2. Green building construction, development, 
operation, and maintenance projects 
10 Green transportation projects 1. Railway transportation projects 
2. Waterway management and vessel 
purchasing projects 
3. Urban public transportation projects 
3.1 Urban public passenger 
transportation projects 
3.2 Urban rail transport projects 
4. Transportation environmental protection 
projects 
11 Energy-saving and environmental 
protection services 
1. Energy-saving services 
2. Environmental protection services 
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3. Water conservation services 
4. Circular economy (cyclical resource 
utilization) services 
 
As a part of the Green Credit Policy, financial institutions are also required to reduce their Credit to 
industries related to "high-pollution, high-emission and overcapacity", excluding loans to technology 
transformation. Although the CBRC does not have a guideline for industries included in the Green 
Credit Policy in their “KPIs for implementing Green Credit” (CBRC, 2014), banks often have mutual 
agreements in the categorization of these industries (Table 3.6). Typically, high-pollution and high-
emission industries are those involved in carbon-intensive activities and toxic waste. Meanwhile, 
overcapacity industries come in a wide variety. Construction materials, namely, steel, cement, and flat 
glass, are all considered overcapacity industries. This may be a result of a reduction in infrastructure 
and real estate development. 
 
Table 3.6: Industries Related to "High-Pollution, High-Emission, and Overcapacity" Projects 
High-Pollution and High-Emission Industries Overcapacity Industries 
Non-metallic mineral product manufacturing (e.g., 
cement) 
Steel 
Ferrous metal smelting and rolling industry (e.g., 
iron and steel) 
Cement 
Raw chemical materials and chemical product 
manufacturing industry 
Flat glass 
Non-ferrous metal smelting and rolling industry 
(e.g., aluminum) 
Coal chemical, calcium carbide 
Rubber and plastic products Ship-building 




3.4 Development Status of the Green Credit Policy 
According to the CBRC, the total balance of green credit is 8.08 trillion RMB (approximately 1.24 
trillion USD). 21 major banks (i.e. policy banks, state-owned banks, joint-stock banks, and postal 
saving banks) contributed 7.01 trillion RMB, which represents 9% of their total loan. 
The sample from this study (see Chapter 4) finds that the green credit balance has been growing for 
the last seven years. Figure 3.2 provides a clearer picture of the overall trend of green credit 
development in China. The total green credit balance (Y-axis on the left side) from the sample banks 
(if available) has been increasing steadily. The growth rate has maintained around 25% (from 2010 to 
2013), ranging from 28.21% (2010) to 23.10% (2013). The growth rate of green credit balance saw a 
boost in 2014, increasing by 5.58% to 28.68%, the fastest growth during the last six periods. 
Conversely, the growth rate dropped by 9.40% to 19.28% in 2015, the lowest growth rate of all the 
periods in this study. 
 













































Green Credit Balance YOY Growth
 
39 
Figure 3.3 presents the total loans to “two-high and one-over” projects. The drop of balance in 
2012 is largely due to missing data from the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and 
the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), which had 142,975 and 624,733 “two-high and one-over” 
loans, respectively. Therefore, the actual balance should be no more than 2,031,421 given the fact that 
the balance from both banks dropped after the missing period. This figure also shows that banks paid 
less attention to controlling loans to “two-high and one-over” industries until around 2011 and 2012, 
confirming the importance of the “Guidelines on Green Credit” in 2012. 
 
Figure 3.3: Total Loans to “Two-High and One-Over” Projects 
 
 
3.5 Literature on China’s Green Credit Policy 
While green finance is growing rapidly, there is limited literature on this discipline, especially in the 
case of China – the Green Credit Policy. Currently, most research on the Green Credit Policy are still 
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policy-maker’s perspective. For instance, Cai (2015) argues that there are possibly five reasons for 
the weak performance of the Green Credit Policy: 
1. Lack of a unified executive standard: There is no joint assessment rules among the banks. It is not 
clear what types of corporations are considered high-polluting, and what types of corporations are 
considered environment-friendly. What is more, the environmental protection administration’s 
penalty on corporations’ polluting behavior is also vague and unclear. Commercial banks chose to 
execute a green credit policy that would benefit themselves, based on their understanding of the 
policies. CIB, for example, focused on innovation in green credit products and achieved good 
outcomes. Though a little behind, four large state-owned banks began to offer green credit, and 
did not have a mature system within them overall. Likewise, most small rural commercial banks 
and city commercial banks have not begun to offer green credit services.  
2. Poor communication of environment information between banks and corporations: The Green 
Credit Policy requires a deep understanding of a corporation’s environmental management 
process. Incomplete information disclosure interferes with a bank’s decision-making. Therefore, 
banks are not able to make the best decisions according to the information they have. There is yet 
a perfect environmental risk management system in place. 
3. Over-intervention by the regional government: Under slower economic growth, regional 
governments wish to achieve more growth in GDP and financial income, but ignore 
environmental consequences. The problem with city commercial banks is that most of their large 
clients are local businesses and/or related to local governments. By restricting the development of 
certain industries, especially those regions that rely on high-polluting industries, regional 
governments may encounter increasing unemployment rates, reduction in tax base, etc.  
4. The need for more awareness in banks of CSR: Commercial banks focus more on making profit 
than managing risks. They tend to treat green credit as normal loans. Moreover, there is no 
special recommendation or development of green credit services. 
5. Lack of new green credit products due to lack of talent: China has limited talented professionals 
in the finance sector, and as a result this causes difficulties in green credit product innovation.  
 
In addition, Ye and Li (2014) pointed out that the development of green credit needs to be backed 
up with policies such as the stimulus binding mechanism, risk compensation, and guaranteed funding. 
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The Green Credit Policy focuses more on restriction and constraint, but it lacks subsidized policies 
(i.e., financial and tax compensation to reduce the cost of green credit (Ma, 2015; Chen, 2016). 
Similarly, Wang and Zhang (2014) suggested that low interest income (generated by green credit) and 
high risk associated with environmental protection and emission reduction projects should be 
compensated.  
Regarding the advantage of the Green Credit Policy, some believe it helps commercial banks in 
managing and improving environmental risk (An, 2008; Chang, Wang, & Li, 2008; Hu & Cao, 2011; 
Wei, 2010). Zhao (2015) found that the Green Credit Policy has a positive effect on energy-saving, 
emissions reduction, and economic development. It is also believed that the Green Credit Policy can 
provide help to environment-friendly industries on pollution reduction, environmental protection, and 





Research Methodology and Models 
 
This chapter introduces the methodology used for this research. The dataset used in the empirical 
study is explained, as well as the statistical methods and appropriate tests for the hypotheses. 
 
4.1 Dataset 
Due to the lack of available databases in the field, the dataset used in this study was built from 
scratch. The dataset used for quantitative analyses was designed to be longitudinal, also known as 
panel data, that involves repeated observations of different individuals over a period of time. This 
would help analyze how different banks develop green credit during the period. 
 
4.1.1 Sample Selection 
The sample was selected based on two criteria: a) considered as “major banks”; b) being publicly 
listed. The term “major banks” can be found in many official press releases from the CBRC, new 
reports, and other financial resources. There are 21 “major banks”, including all the policy banks, 
state-owned commercial banks, and national joint-stock commercial banks, with the addition of 
Postal Savings Bank of China. Since this dataset relies solely from publicly available information, 
publicly listed banks were also included given that they must disclose financial statements and other 
requirements set by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). As of September 2016, 
there was a total of 33 banks that traded on either the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) or the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) to Chinese investors and Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors 
(QFII); on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (SEHK) to global investors; or on both the SSE/SZSE and 
the SEHK. 
Initially, 39 banks met at least one of these two criteria in China. The sample is composed of three 
policy banks, five state-owned commercial banks, 12 national joint-stock (three unlisted), one postal 
savings bank, 14 city commercial banks, and four rural commercial banks. The sample was shortlisted 
to 24 due to the availability of data (further discussed in section 4.2). 
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Table 4.1: Summary of Banks in the Sample 





Number of banks 
included in the 
initial dataset 
Number of 
banks in the 
final dataset 
Policy banks 3 0 3 1 
State-owned 
commercial banks 
5 5 5 5 
National joint-stock 
commercial banks 
12 9 12 10 
Postal savings banks 1 1 1 0 
City commercial 
banks 
144 14 14 8 
Rural commercial 
banks and rural 
credit unions 
53 4 4 0 
 
4.1.2 Source of Data 
All publicly available information was used to build the dataset. The dataset for quantitative analyses 
predominately referred to two types of reports. Annual data were collected for both types of data. 
 
Financial data and indicators 
The financial performances of all the publicly listed banks are available from many official 
sources. As a general requirement of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the 
Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) of Hong Kong, stock issuers are asked to disclose their 
financial statements on a regular basis. Period reports can be found on the stock exchanges’ website, 
official websites of the banks, as well as many other financial data providers’ websites. According to 
basic listing requirements for equities from the CSRC and SFC, companies are required to have a 
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trading record of no less than three financial years. Therefore, publicly listed banks have their past 
three years’ financial statements ready for investors’ review, though most banks provided a record of 
five years instead. Many unlisted banks also make their financial information available on their 
websites, though some only provide a summary of financials. Overall, financial data and indicators 
from the sample are mostly available for the past 10 fiscal years, while few only publish information 
for three years. Although most key financial data and indicators were available quarterly, only annual 
data were collected as green finance data were not available quarterly.  
 
Green finance data 
Banks rarely discuss green finance or green credit in their annual reports. Therefore, green finance 
data were collected mostly from CSR or sustainability reports issued by the banks. Typically, banks 
would discuss their responsibility to the economy, environment, and society. In some cases, banks 
with specialization in a specific sector would also discuss their responsibility to the sector. For 
instance, the Agricultural Bank of China also included discussion regarding agricultural development. 
The dataset relied heavily on the environment section. Although most banks have adopted Global 
Reporting Initiatives (GRI) version 4.0, the actual report often varies among different banks and 
sometimes changes across time. Thus, the availability of data from each report also varies. 
The dataset uses “Notice of the China Banking Regulatory Commission on Key Performance 
Indicators of Green Credit Implementation” as a guideline when building the dataset for green finance 
data. All nine core indicators on “Support and Limited Loan” were included, as well as three optional 
indicators – “Carbon emission (tons) per employee generated during business activities; “Average 
power consumed by employee (kw-h)”; and “Hours of green credit training per employee in a year”. 
In addition, some banks also reported reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from their green credit, 
number of green loans, as well as loans to industries with high pollution, high energy consumption, 
and overcapacity. These data were categorized as “environmental benefits from green finance”, 
“number of loans to environmental protection, emission reduction, and energy saving projects”; 






Table 4.2: Green Finance Indicators 
Type of indicator Name of indicator 
Core indicators 
1. Credit to projects and services for environmental protection and emission 
reduction 
2. Credit to emerging strategic industries for energy-saving & environmental 
protection, new energy, and new-energy vehicles 
3. Total amounts of said two items 
4. Credit to industries related to "high-pollution, high-emission and overcapacity" 
(excluding loans to technology transformation) 
5. Credit to enterprises related to obsolete industry capacity  
6. Credit to enterprises violating laws and regulations on environmental 
protection 
7. Credit to enterprises violating safety production 
8. Emission Reduction of CO2 equivalent to every RMB 100 million loan 
9. Development of main e-banking business 
Optional 
indicators 
10. Carbon emission (tons) per employee generated during business activities 
11. Average power consumed by employee (kw-h) 
12. Hours of green credit training per employee in a year 
Additional 
indicators 
13. Environmental benefits from green finance  








4.2 Data Processing 
After the raw data were gathered, the dataset was processed to increase reliability. The problem of 
heavy-tailed distribution and missing data were dealt with during data processing. In the beginning, 
some basic data calculations and transformations were performed because some of the data were not 
readily available. For instance, some banks only published a proportion of their green credit in terms 
of total loans. This ratio is transformed to the amount of green credit outstanding after being 
multiplied by total loan outstanding. 
 
4.2.1 Unusual observations due to special event 
During the initial data collecting stage, both green finance data and financial data were collected for a 
range of 10 years. After looking at the distribution of the data, the first three years of data were 
dropped due to a special event taking place in the 2010s. Dropping these data may help reduce the 
biasness from external factors. 
The NPL ratio appears to improve suddenly after the first three years of data. After a thorough 
investigation, the decision was made to exclude the first three years of data from the dataset. Figure 
4.1 shows that the average NPL ratios of the banks during 2006-2008 are significantly higher than 
2009 onward. As the NPL ratio is the most important element of this research, a careful examination 









Figure 4.1: NPL Ratio from 2006 to 2015 (24 Sample Banks) 
 
 
The outcome of the examination is that this improvement in NPL ratio is mostly a result of 
dumping non-performing assets. Chinese banks had been carrying a high NPL ratio for a long period 
of time and right up until the late 2000s. Years of government-directed lending had created large 
numbers of NPLs. Central Bank reported that NPLs accounted for 21.4% to 26.1% of total lending of 
the “big four” state-owned banks in 2002. In 1999, four asset management companies (AMC) were 
established to take over the NPLs from the banks. The AMCs repackaged these NPLs into viable 
assets and to sell them to risk-loving investors. Banks had been selling NPLs to AMCs since the 
AMCs were founded. 
In fact, to show more attractive financial statements to investors, banks were more active in selling 
NPLs before going public. For example, Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), which launched the 
Initial Public Offering (IPO) of its stock to the investing public on the SSE and SEHK simultaneously 
in July 2010, had NPL ratios of 23.43% and 23.57% in 2006 and 2007, respectively, before dropping 

















2.00% from 2006 to 2008 before decreasing to 1.25% in 2009. CEB went public in 2010. However, 
there were some exceptions. For example, Ping An Bank, which launched its IPO to global investors 
on the SZSE back in 1991, improved its NPL ratio from 7.99% in 2006 to 0.68% in 2008 without 
additional IPO on the SEHK. In addition, the descriptive data in Table 4.3 show that the mean and 
median of NPL ratios from 2009 onward are much closer, meaning that the distribution of the data is 
more symmetrical. 
 
Table 4.3: Descriptive Data of NPL Ratio from 2006 to 2015 
Year Mean Median SD Count 
2006 3.85% 2.53% 4.83% 22  
2007 3.08% 2.06% 4.56% 24  
2008 1.76% 1.73% 0.92% 24 
2009 1.20% 1.12% 0.60% 24  
2010 0.85% 0.72% 0.41% 24  
2011 0.72% 0.64% 0.33% 24  
2012 0.76% 0.76% 0.31% 24  
2013 0.83% 0.87% 0.23% 24  
2014 1.07% 1.11% 0.20% 24  
2015 1.39% 1.43% 0.33% 24  
 
4.2.2 Data Imputation of Green Credit Data 
The biggest challenge in this research is the availability of green credit data. Because many banks did 
not provide their green credit data in their annual reports and sustainability reports, there is, as a 
result, a large amount of missing data on green credit balance. To deal with the missing data, this 
study estimated the missing green credit balance and loan to “two-high and one-over” projects based 
on the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) from the data available. The estimation involves two 
steps. The first step is to calculate the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of green credit (or 









 −  1 
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The second step is to estimate the missing data with the CAGR. The formula to estimate missing 
data before the beginning period and the missing data after the ending period are: 




𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 ×(1 + 𝐶𝐴𝐺𝑅) 
 
The compound annual growth rate makes sense for this type of estimation because the green credit 
balance accumulates over time. The drawback of this method is that the growth rate of the green 
credit balance delivers less meaningful information now because the growth rates of those estimated 
periods are the same as the compound growth rate. Therefore, only original data were used to test 
hypothesis 1. 
Samples with less than three years of green credit balance available were excluded, since relying on 
growth rate between two years would increase inaccuracy. Therefore, 13 of the 39 banks which only 
reported their green credit of two or fewer years were excluded. Also, Agricultural Development 
Bank of China (ADBC) and Bank of Guiyang were excluded due to the lack of financial data. The 
remaining 24 banks reported the green credit balance for at least three periods, but only 14 of which 
provided the balance of loans to “two-high and one-over” for at least three periods. The statistical 
tests related to “two-high and one-over” loans had to settle with only 14 samples. 
For the remaining 24 samples, 50% do not require estimation, 33% had a green credit balance 
available for five or six periods, requiring estimations for only one or two periods, and only 17% 
needed estimations for three or four periods (Table 4.4). The actual data after the data imputation is 
included in Appendix A. 
 
Table 4.4: Data Availability of Included Samples  
Number of years 
available 
Variable 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Total 





3 6 3 2 0 0 2 8 24 
 
A comparison of the data before and after imputation (Table 4.5) was conducted to check the 
quality of data imputation. The mean of the green credit balance was reduced by about 20,000 million 
RMB because the early years with a lower green credit balance were added to the dataset. The 
minimal green credit balance shows quite a significant reduction from 33 million RMB to 2.28 
million. In fact, this is an estimation of the same banks in the earlier years. The banks began to offer 
green credit at relatively late, but increased the green finance balance significantly. This fast growth 
rate was used to estimate the green credit balance in the earlier years, thus creating a very significant 
drop. 
 
Table 4.5: Data Imputation – Before and after Comparison 
Variable name Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Green credit balance 
(before)  
144 143,092 254,828 33 1,570,000 
Green credit balance 
(after) 
168 123,052 240,895 2.28 1,570,000 
Loan to “two-high and 
one-over” projects 
(before) 
90 120,901 167,780 533 669,160 
Loan to “Two-high and 
one-over” projects 
(after) 
109 122,107 171,103 553 669,160 
  
4.3 Test for Hypothesis 1 
To test hypothesis 1, statistical tests were designed to learn whether growth of the green credit 
balance increases the growth rate of total loans. 
 
51 
Hypothesis 1: Green credit is an expanding product or service that grows at a faster rate than total 
loans. 
 
4.3.1 Test Methodologies 




Descriptive analyses are commonly used in all types of statistical studies. Descriptive statistics of 
the “difference between growth rate of green credit to growth of total loans”, including mean, 
standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis, were calculated to analyze the distribution of the sample. 
The mean of this indicator tells whether the difference between the growth rate is significantly larger 
than 0%. The standard deviation (SD) can show the range of this indicator, assuming the data has a 
normal distribution. Skewness and kurtosis provide a measurement of symmetry (or lack of 
symmetry) and tail-heaviness of the sample. Overall, descriptive analyses provide a quick view of the 
indicator. 
 
Random-Effects Panel Regression vs Fixed-Effects Panel Regression 
The data used in this study were collected on 24 banks over time periods from 2009 to 2015, as 
both time and individual difference among banks are important factors. Time is an important factor 
because the idea is to analyze the effect on outcomes when the inputs change over time. Studying 
multiple targets allow for individual-specific factors to be built into the model. 
The panel regression is a two-dimensional analysis (Madalla, 2001) which estimates outcomes 
from multiple target banks (i) across time horizon (t). This comprehensive methodology provides an 
overall view on green credit of the entire banking sector. 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
With panel/longitudinal data, the most commonly estimated models are fixed-effects and random-
effects models. In a fixed-effects model, it is assumed that there are some omitted variables that are 
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correlated with explanatory variables in the model. The fixed model provides a mean for controlling 
omitted variable bias. These omitted variables must be time-invariant (such as state-owned or city 
commercial banks), meaning that they should not be correlated with other individual characteristics. 
The idea is that the effects the omitted variables have on the subject at one point in time will also 
cause the same effect at a later point in time (Allison, 2009). In fixed models, the error term and the 
constant must not be correlated with other variables. Moreover, a fixed-effects model can be biased 
because of the incidental parameters problem (Neyman & Scott, 1948; Lancaster, 2000). 
In contrast, a random-effects model is preferred because it analyzes two sources of variance – 
variance between subjects and variance within the subject over time (Kahane, 2007). The random-
effects model assumes that differences across entities have an influence on the dependent variable, 
and omitted or unobserved variables are not correlated with the observed variables (Allison, 2009). 
Random-effects models are often measured via Generalized Least Squares (GLS). Greene (2012) 
suggests that the crucial distinction between fixed- and random-effects models is whether the 
unobserved individual effect contains elements that are correlated with the independent variables, not 
whether these effects are random. 
 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test 
The Durbin–Wu–Hausman test (Hausman, 1978), also known as the Hausman test, is a statistical 
hypothesis test in econometrics commonly used to decide between fixed- or random-effects models in 
the panel regression. The Hausman test evaluates the consistency of an estimator when compared to 
an alternative estimator which is already known to be consistent (Greene, 2012). The Hausman test 
investigates the null hypothesis – the random-effects model is preferred when compared to the fixed-
effects model. 
 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) Test for random-effects 
The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) test is used to test whether a random-effects 
regression should be chosen over a simple OLS regression (Breusch & Pagan, 1979). The null 
hypothesis in the LM test is that variances across entities is zero (i.e., no panel effect). In other words, 




4.3.2 Test Model (Test 1) 
Hypothesis 1 uses the following model for the GLS random effect panel regression test:  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  
Yit represents the growth rate of total loan of each individual bank from 2009 to 2015. This 
dependent variable is calculated by: 
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 (𝑡) =  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠  (𝑡)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝑡 − 1)
 
Xit represents the growth rate of the green credit of each individual bank from 2009 to 2015. This 
independent variable is calculated by: 
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 (𝑡) =  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 (𝑡)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 (𝑡 − 1)
 
 
The expected outcome of the study is that the growth rate of green credit will increase the growth rate 
of total loans. This is supported by the literature mentioned in section 2.5.2 entitled, “Business 
opportunities”. 
 
4.4 Test for Hypotheses 2 and 3 – Two-Stage Estimation Model in Predicting 
Conceptual Model (Tests 2 and 3) 
A Two-stage Least Square (2sls) estimation model is used to test hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 3.  
Hypothesis 2: Allocating large shares of green credit to the loan portfolio reduces credit risk (i.e., 
NPL ratio of the bank). 
Hypothesis 3: Allocating large share of loans to high-pollution, high-emission, and overcapacity 




4.4.1 Test Methodologies 
The statistical models incorporate Two-stage Least Square regression analysis with Granger causality 
(Granger, 1969). The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) is performed to test whether the 
2sls model is more efficient than the random-effect model. 
  
Two-stage Least Square Panel Regression 
Many economic models involve endogeneity where a theoretical relationship does not fit into a Y-
on-X regression (Wooldridge, 2013). Endogeneity can arise because of: 1) model misspecification or 
omitted variables; 2) measurement error; or 3) simultaneity (Wooldridge, 2013). The issue of 
endogeneity can cause a correlation between the explanatory independent variable and the error terms 
of the dependent variable (Greene, 2012), and render the test result (i.e., coefficient) a bias estimation. 
The conceptual framework suggests that it is the management’s decision on green finance that 
influences final financial performance. Therefore, there might be some other sustainability practices 
that influence performance. However, these sustainability indicators are impossible to quantify and 
may not be directly related to performance. 
The Two-stage Least Square (2sls) regression model is commonly used to deal with endogeneity 
through the use of instrumental variables. The instrumental variables must be correlated with the 
endogenous variables, but not correlated with the error term (Wooldridge, 2013).  
 




Two-stage least squares models are used when the dependent variables in the first and second stage 
models are continuous. The 2sls starts with replacing the endogenous variable with a predicted 
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version, formed by regressing this variable on all exogenous variables and the instrumental variables. 
The predicted endogenous variable is then used to regress the dependent variables. The actual 
regression is performed by Stata®. 
 
The basic 2sls model can be represented as: 
First stage:   ?̂? = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑍 + 𝛾2𝑊 + 𝑢 
Second stage:   𝑌 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1?̂? +  𝛽2𝑊 + 𝑢   (Model 2) 
 
In this study, the first stage predicts what kind of characteristics related to sustainability (Z) a bank 
with a higher percentage of green credit (or loans to “two-high and one-over” industries) in terms of 
total loan (X) has. The second stage analyzes the effect of green credit (X) on the performance of 
credit risk management (Y). The advantage of this model is that it considers the percentage of green 
credit as an explanatory variable while keeping all other proven variables as exogenous variables. 
This may better test the effect of green credit on the performance of credit risk management. 
 
Figure 4.3: Two-Stage Least Square Estimation Model 
 
 
The 2sls model has been developing since the 1950s in econometrics in the context of simultaneous 
equation models (Basmann, 1957). It has been used in many studies related to voluntary 
environmental programs (e.g., Khanna & Damon, 1999; Rivera & De Leon, 2005; Lin, 2012). 
 
 




Green credit in 







Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity 
Two-stage estimation models are not always better than linear models in determining correlation 
between two variables because of inefficiency problem (Greene, 2012). The Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
test is used here to determine whether 2sls models are better than the alternative (i.e., random-effects 
model). The Hausman test examines whether the endogeneity for two-stage models is present. If the 
endogeneity does not exist, then the two-stage model is considered unnecessary, and a random-effects 
model (Model 1) should be used. Correspondingly, the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) test 
is used to validate the random-effects model.  




Some studies suggest that there is a delay between sustainability performance and financial 
performance (Weber, 2016). Louzis et al. (2012) and Ghosh (2015) also found the persistence of a 
lagged effect on NPL ratios. In fact, all loans (including green loans) are unlikely to default during the 
same year of issuance. Therefore, a lag between green finance and NPL ratio are used to analyze 
Granger causality (Granger, 1969). To reduce the complexity, only the lagged effect of independent 
variables (proportion of green credit in test 2 and proportion of loans to “two-high and one-over” 
industries in test) are tested. Independent variables in year t-1 (Model 3), year t-2 (Model 4), and year 
t-3 (Model 5) were used, respectively, to measure the dependent variables in year t.  
 
4.4.2 Variables and Test Models (Tests 2 and 3) 
The 2sls model used in the test for hypotheses 2 and 3 can be represented as: 
First stage:   ?̂? = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑍 + 𝛾2𝑊 + 𝑢 
Second stage:   𝑌 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1?̂? +  𝛽2𝑊 + 𝑢   (Model 2) 
 
X̂ represents the predicted management’s decision on the proportion of green credit in terms of 
total loans (or proportion of loans to “two-high and one-over” industries in test 3). 
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Y represents the NPL ratio of the bank. 
Z represents the instrumental variables. 
W represents the exogeneous variables. There are multiple exogeneous variables. Each variable has 
its corresponding coefficient. 
 
The basic 2sls estimation model is composed of the dependent variable (Y), endogenous variables 
(X), instrumental variables (Z), and exogeneous variables (W). The test models utilized research from 
Berger and DeYoung (1997), Louzis et al. (2010), and Ghosh (2015), adding green credit into their 
concepts. The actual variables are explained as follows: 
 
A. Dependent variable 
NPL ratio 
The “NPL ratio” is the dependent variable of this model. Year-end NPL ratio is used to reflect the 
financial performance at a fixed point of time.  
The NPL ratio is calculated as 𝑁𝑃𝐿 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑁𝑃𝐿 (𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟−𝑒𝑛𝑑)




B. Endogenous variables 
Proportion of green credit to total loans (Test 2 only) 
The endogenous variables – the proportion of green credit (POGC) to total loans is also the 
explanatory variable for the dependent variable. The POGC is the predicted management’s decision 
on the proportion of green credit in terms of total loans based on their strategy in sustainable banking. 
The POGC is expected to negatively influence the NPL ratio given that green credit has minimal 
environmental risks. 
𝑃𝑂𝐺𝐶 =
𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 − 𝑒𝑛𝑑)





Proportion of “two-high and one-over” loans to total loans (Test 3 only) 
Proportion of “two-high and one-over” (POTO) represents a bank’s loan to non-environment-
friendly industries. A large percentage denotes that a bank has less intention in “going green”. These 
loans have more exposure to environmental risk. Therefore, having a large number of “two-high and 
one-over” loans raises the NPL ratio. 
𝑃𝑂𝑇𝑂 =
"Two − high and one − over balance" (𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 − 𝑒𝑛𝑑)




C. Instrumental Variables (IV) 
Type of bank 
The type of bank matters due to government influence. Managers who act on the best interests of 
their shareholders implement shareholders’ orders. As explained in section 3.1.3, those banks that 
have strong connections with the government are more responsive to the Green Credit Policy than 
those that do not (Table 3.3). Apparently, policy banks are anticipated to help with policies. Their 
sole purpose is to complement the nation’s development plan. National joint-stock banks are also 
influenced by the government to a certain degree. City commercial banks are even less responsive to 
the Green Credit Policy. Over interventions from local governments (Cai, 2015) render green credit 
less favorable to their local customers. The Postal Savings Bank of China and rural commercial 
banks, on the other hand, have different specializations, though green agriculture is emerging as one 
of the green credit products. Nevertheless, bank type does not evidently influence NPL ratios. 
Therefore, the type of bank is coded as an instrumental variable on an ordinal scale of 1 to 5 (Table 
4.6). The higher the code, the more attention management pays to the green credit. However, the 






Table 4.6: Coding of Bank Type 
Type of Bank Coding Number in the sample 
Policy banks 5 1 
State-owned commercial banks 4 5 
National joint-stock commercial banks 3 10 
Postal Savings Bank 2 0 
City commercial banks 1 8 
Rural commercial banks 0 0 
 
 
D. Exogenous Variables 
Credit quality 
The credit quality (or ‘loan loss provision-to-total loans’) indicator reflects a bank’s credit quality. 
The theory for this indicator is the ‘moral hazard hypothesis’. This hypothesis was first introduced by 
Keeton and Morris (1987) who argued that moral hazard, such as incentives, would increase the 
riskiness of the loan portfolio. The indicator is proven to have a significant positive influence on NPL 






Return on assets (ROA) 
According to Berger and DeYoung’s (1997) ‘bad management’ hypothesis, managers with poor 
skills often do no monitor their loans very well. In fact, having less NPL means keeping more profits. 









The cost efficiency effect is controversial. The ‘skimping hypothesis’ and ‘bad management 
hypothesis’ (Berger and DeYoung, 1997) both apply to this indicator. The ‘skimping hypothesis’ 
demonstrates that banks with fewer resources to monitor loans are more cost-efficient. Conversely, 
the ‘bad management hypothesis’ argues that substandard managers often give out low quality loans. 







The solvency ratio measures a bank’s leverage. It represents a bank’s attitude towards risk. 
Similarly, banks suffering a ‘moral hazard’ issue typically have low-capitalization as the manager 
attempts to provide more loans while ignoring the riskiness of the loans (Berger & DeYoung, 1997). 
Reluctantly providing loans increases the asset and liability simultaneously, but the shareholder’s 
equity is not increased. This ultimately increases the bank’s leverage. Therefore, the solvency ratio is 







The ‘too-big-to-fail hypothesis’ underlines the importance of this indicator. In larger markets, 
banks commonly take excessive risks as they may seek government protection in the case of failure 













Table 4.7: Summary of Variables and Expected Results 













‘Environmental risk’ (-) 
POTO 
(Test 3 only) 
𝑷𝑶𝑻𝑶𝒊𝒕 =
𝑻𝒘𝒐 − 𝒉𝒊𝒈𝒉 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒐𝒏𝒆 − 𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒕
𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒍𝒐𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒊𝒕
 






‘Moral hazard’ (+) 



























Type of bank Ordinal scale of 1 to 5 Government influence (+) 
 
 
In Test 2, Model 1 (regular panel regression), Model 2 (2sls), and Models 3, 4, 5 test whether 
banks with a larger proportion of green credit have a lower NPL ratio. In Model 1, preferably the 
random-effects panel regression is used to compare against the two-stage model (Model 2). 








Table 4.8: Statistical Test Model for Hypothesis 2 




Models 3, 4, 5 
Equation 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ?̂? = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑍 + 𝛾2𝑊 + 𝑢 
𝑌 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1?̂? +  𝛽2𝑊 + 𝑢 
?̂? = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑍 + 𝛾2𝑊 + 𝑢 
𝑌 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1?̂? +  𝛽2𝑊 + 𝑢 
Dependent variable NPLR NPLR NPLR 
Independent 
variables (RE) / 
Endogenous 
variables (2sls) 
POGC POGC POGC in year t-1, year t-2, 
and year t-3 
Instrumental 
variables 
N/A Type of bank Type of bank 
Control variables Credit quality, ROA, 
inefficiency, non-
interest ratio, solvency, 
size 
Credit quality, ROA, 
inefficiency, non-interest 
ratio, solvency, size 
Credit quality, ROA, 
inefficiency, non-interest 
ratio, solvency, size 
 
In Test 3, all the models remain the same, expect that the independent variables or endogenous 














Table 4.9: Statistical Test Model for Hypothesis 3 




Models 3, 4, 5 
Equation 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ?̂? = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑍 + 𝛾2𝑊 + 𝑢 
𝑌 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1?̂? +  𝛽2𝑊 + 𝑢 
?̂? = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑍 + 𝛾2𝑊 + 𝑢 
𝑌 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1?̂? +  𝛽2𝑊 + 𝑢 
Dependent variable NPLR NPLR NPLR 
Independent 
variables (RE) / 
Endogenous 
variables (2sls) 
POTO POTO POTO in year t-1, year t-2, 
and year t-3 
Instrumental 
variables 
N/A Type of bank Type of bank 
Control variables Credit quality, ROA, 
inefficiency, non-
interest ratio, solvency, 
size 
Credit quality, ROA, 
inefficiency, non-interest 
ratio, solvency, size 
Credit quality, ROA, 
inefficiency, non-interest 







Results and Findings 
 
This chapter presents the test results of the statistical model as well as the descriptive statistics. 
 
5.1 Test Results of Hypothesis 1 
The descriptive statistics and regression models both confirm “Hypothesis 1: Green credit is an 
expanding product or service that grows at a faster rate than total loans”. 
 
Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics of the “difference between growth of green credit to growth of total 
loans” (mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, and count) of the banks in the sample are 
presented in table 5.1. The “difference between growth of green credit to growth of all loans” is 
calculated by growth of green credit minus growth of total loans, if both data are available for the 
same year. 
The descriptive statistics suggest that green loans grow at a faster rate than the total amount of 
loans in the sample. However, the high standard deviation suggests that the actual difference between 
the growth rate varies widely among banks – green credit grows rapidly compared to total loans in 
some banks while green credit may grow slower in other banks. The positive skewness above 1 
suggests that the data is positively skewed, or right-hand tailed. Meanwhile, the positive kurtosis 
suggests that the data is peaked, meaning that the data have more weight in the tails.  
If the data is broken down based on a bank's type, the data reflects that state-owned banks and city 
commercial banks enjoy more growth from green credit than joint-stock commercial banks. The joint-
commercial has a slow-down trend in 2014 and 2015. City commercial banks, on the other hand, were 
very slow in the development of green credit pre-2012, but then caught up quickly. In fact, the 
difference between the green credit growth and the growth of total loans of city commercial banks 
was at its largest in 2014 and 2015. 
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics for Difference Between Growth of Green Credit and Total 
Loans 
 
YEAR MEAN SD SKEWNESS KURTOSIS COUNT 
ALL 2009 73.60% 141.83% 1.677 1.591 8 
2010 4.70% 56.58% 1.872 6.367 13 
2011 4.40% 22.12% -0.549 0.692 17 
2012 86.70% 185.91% 2.413 5.690 20 
2013 25.06% 66.02% 2.916 10.214 23 
2014 24.98% 70.91% 3.008 11.032 23 
2015 18.70% 57.05% 3.725 15.953 23 
  
     
STATE-
OWNED 
(5 IN TOTAL) 
2009 -5.59% 5.60% N/A N/A 2 
2010 -5.14% 13.79% 0.423 -2.183 5 
2011 11.36% 14.72% 1.023 0.184 5 
2012 4.86% 30.82% 1.960 3.988 5 
2013 37.91% 54.70% 0.590 -2.971 5 
2014 2.09% 17.63% 1.392 1.944 5 
2015 19.81% 17.21% -0.250 -2.173 5 
  





2009 154.01% 172.28% 0.476 -3.301 4 
2010 12.66% 93.26% 1.363 2.996 5 
2011 -0.90% 28.23% -0.270 -0.250 8 
2012 136.12% 245.13% 1.728 2.118 10 
2013 28.75% 91.28% 2.832 8.354 10 
2014 6.39% 21.45% 0.856 0.766 9 
2015 -2.91% 19.70% 0.955 0.525 9 
  
     
CITY 
(8 IN TOTAL) 
2009 -8.32% N/A N/A N/A 1 
2010 -2.10% 38.04% N/A N/A 2 
2011 4.95% 20.99% 1.393 N/A 3 
2012 84.08% 127.27% 1.589 2.366 4 
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2013 14.98% 32.48% 0.295 -0.213 7 
2014 57.15% 114.06% 1.644 2.988 8 
2015 45.47% 90.03% 2.466 6.437 8 
 
 
Figure 5.1 converts the data from Table 5.1 into a graph. The difference in growth peaked in 2009 
and 2012 and remained relatively steady after 2013, which coincides with the timeline of the major 
Green Credit Policies – Guidelines on CSR for the Chinese banking sector in 2009, Guidelines on 
Green Credit in 2012, and the KPI of Green Credit Implementation in 2014 (see Table 3.3 for 
reference). This indicates that banks were responding to these policies when they were issued. Figure 
5.2 compares the sum of green credit balance and the sum of total loans using an index of 100 based 
on year 2009. The indexed figure enables direct comparison between the accumulated rates of green 
credit and total loans. The growth rate of total loans is quite steady during this period, but the growth 
rate of green credit balance is much faster. This is also the reason why the spread between the index 
gets wider in the end. 
Overall, the descriptive data show faster growth of green credit when compared to the growth of 
total loans. The difference between the growth rate is within 25% to 50% over the seven-year period, 















Figure 5.1: Difference between Growth of Green Credit and Growth of Total Loans 
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Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 1 (Test 1) 
Generalized least squares (GLS) panel regression is employed to test hypothesis 1. The model is 
built to find the relationships between growth of total loans (dependent variable) and growth of green 
credit (independent). The results of the test may help to justify the observations from the descriptive 
statistics. 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡    
where Yit represents the growth rate of total loans and Xit represents the growth rate of green credit. 
H0: There is no statistically significant correlation between the growth of green loans and the 
growth of total loans. 
 
The test results from the GLS random-effects panel regression (Table 5.2) show that a 1% increase 
in green credit increases the total loans by 0.014% at a significance level of 5.4%. Although the 
significance level is fairly close to 5%, the results from this model are not sufficient to confirm that 
the increase in the growth rate of green credit will increase the growth rate of total loans. 
Alternatively, other regression methodologies are viewed to see whether there is a better statistical 
model for Test 1. 
 
Table 5.2: Test Results of Panel Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 1 (Test 1) 
Growth of total loans Coefficient SD P>z 
Growth of green credit 0.014 0.007 0.054 






Coefficient significance: *P<0.05 
 
The results of the Hausman test (Table 5.3) are in favor of the random-effects model over the fixed-
effects model. The p-value is 0.2580, which is much larger than 0.05. However, the result from the 
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LM test (Table 5.4) suggests that there is no evidence of a significant difference across banks. 
Therefore, a pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression (Table 5.5) is sufficient for this test. 
 
 
Table 5.3: Hausman Test Results for Random-Effects Model 
Coefficients  (b)  (B)  (b-B)  Sqrt (diag(V_b-
V_B))  
 Fixed Random Difference S.E. 
Growth of green 
credit 
0.0101866 0.0136874 -0.0035008  0.0033589 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg  
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under H0; obtained from xtreg  
Test: H0: difference in coefficients not systematic  
chi2(1) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)= 1.09 
Prob>chi2 = 0.2973 
 
 
Table 5.4: Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) Test for Random-Effects 
Growth of total loansit = Xb + ui + eit 
Estimated results Var SD=Sqrt(Var) 
Growth of total loans 0.0064919 0.0805723 
e 0.0061269 0.0782748 
u 0.0002305 0.0151823 
Test: Var(u) = 0 
chibar2(01) = 0.07 






Table 5.5: Test Results of OLS Regression Analysis for Hypothesis 1 (Test 1) 
Growth of total loans Coefficient SD P>z 
Growth of green credit 0.014 0.007 0.047* 






Coefficient significance: *P<0.05 
 
Conversely, the more effective pooled OLS regression (Table 5.5) finds a significant effect of the 
growth of green credit. In fact, the OLS model has an identical coefficient and standard deviation 
with the random-effects panel regression, but the OLS model shows a slightly stronger level of 
significance. The result from the OLS model also suggests that a 1% increase in green credit increases 
the total loans by 0.014%, but at a significance level under 5%.  
The result from the OLS model confirms that an increase in the growth rate of green credit will 
lead to a faster growth rate of total loans. Combining the results from the OLS model and the 
descriptive data, these results demonstrated that green credit is a fast-growing product or service 
which increases growth rate of total loans for the banks. 
 
 
5.2 Test Results for Hypothesis 2 
The results from the preferred 2sls panel regression models confirm “Hypothesis 2: Allocating large 
shares of green credit to the loan portfolio reduces credit risk (i.e., NPL ratio of the bank). The 
descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the data was conducted before running the test models 






Table 5.6: Descriptive Statistics for Test 2 
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max 
NPL ratio 168 0.0097327 0.0042845 0.001 0.0291 
POGC 168 0.0342357 0.0371159 0.0001 0.2215 
Credit quality 168 0.0239427 0.005936 0.011001 0.045258 
ROA 168 0.010947 0.0022033 0.0029 0.0167 
Inefficiency 168 0.4292731 0.1110364 0.284463 0.938463 
Solvency 168 0.0593432 0.0105749 0.033294 0.087589 
Size 168 0.0416195 0.0520565 0.0007034 0.1950136 
Type of bank 168 2.625 1.255825 1 5 
 
 
Table 5.7: Correlation Matrix of Variables Related to Test 2 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1.NPL ratio 1.000        
2.POGC -0.021 1.000       
3.Credit quality 0.543* 0.288* 1.000      
4.ROA -0.151* 0.065 -0.003 1.000     
5.Inefficiency -0.006 -0.207* -0.053 -0.430* 1.000    
6.Solvency 0.068 0.185* 0.148* 0.530* -0.306* 1.000   
7.Size 0.347* 0.363* 0.326* 0.291* -0.154* 0.295* 1.000  
8.Type of bank 0.201* 0.484* 0.160* -0.098 -0.076 0.081 0.706 1.000 
 
Coefficient significance: *P<0.05 
 
Regression analysis for Hypothesis 2 (Test 2) 
Test 2 uses a series of regression analysis techniques to test the following hypothesis: 
H0: Allocating more green credit to the loan portfolio does not have a significant impact on the 
NPL ratio of the banks. 
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Test results from both Model 1 random-effects model (RE) and Model 2 two-stage least square 
model (2sls) find significant effects of the POGC (Table 5.8). That is, banks with a larger POGC have 
a lower NPL ratio. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is confirmed – allocating large share of green credit to the loan 
portfolio reduces the NPL ratio of the banks. 
 
Table 5.8: Test Results of Hypothesis 2 (Test 2) 
 Model 1 (RE) Model 2 (2sls) 
 NPLR First stage (POGC) Second stage (NPLR) 
POGC -0.022(0.010)**  -0.076(0.038)** 
Type of bank (IV)  0.015(0.004)***  
Credit quality 0.326(0.053)*** 1.904(0.375)*** 0.416(0.085)*** 
ROA -0.950(0.158)*** 0.261(1.211) -1.041(0.177)*** 
Inefficiency -0.008(0.004)** -0.061(0.028)** -0.012(0.005)*** 
Solvency 0.052(0.028)* 0.243(0.206) 0.067(0.032)** 
Size 0.029(0.008)*** -0.086(0.093) 0.039(0.012)*** 











Coefficient significance: *P<0.10, **P<0.05, ***P<0.01 
 
The results of the Hausman test (Table 5.9) provide the existence of endogeneity. Therefore, the 
2sls model (Model 2) should be used over the random-effects model. The 2sls model shows that a 1% 
increase in the POGC will reduce the NPL ratio of the bank by a 0.00076 percentage point at a 






Table 5.9: Hausman Test Results for Random-effects Model 
Coefficients  (b)  (B)  (b-B)  Sqrt (diag(V_b-
V_B))  
 2sls RE Difference S.E. 
POGC -.0761466     -0.0219975 -0.0541491  0.027024 
Credit quality 0.4158093 0.3258913 0.089918 0.0377025 
ROA -1.040637 -0.0949626 -0.0910114 . 
Inefficiency -0.0124764 -0.0079633 -0.0045132 0.0005863 
Solvency 0.0674108   0.0516749 0.0157359 . 
Size 0.0393245 0.0291683 0.0101561 0.0027789 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtivreg  
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under H0; obtained from xtreg  
Test: H0: difference in coefficients not systematic  
chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)= 3.82 
Prob>chi2 = 0.7008 
(V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
 
 
Finally, in order to test whether Granger causality (Granger, 1969) exists between POGC and NPL 
ratio, the dependent variables (NPL ratio) was measured by using POGC in year t-1, t-2, and t-3 in 
Model 3, 4 , and 5 resptively. The results reveled no significance in Models 3, 4 and 5 (Table 5.10). 
Therefore, POGC is not a granger cause of NPL ratio. Green credit is unlikely to default during the 
same year of issuance. The addition of non-default loans to the total loan portfolio dilutes the NPL 
ratio in the same year with corresponding effects. Therefore, the increment in the POGC should have 
the strongest influence on the NPL ratio in the same year. Nonetheless, the most efficient model – 
2sls model (Model 2) - confirms that allocating more green credit to the loan portfolio reduces the 
NPL ratio of the banks. 
In addition, most exogenous variables are found to have a significant effect on the NPL ratio of the 
banks. This confirms the validity of the models, as well as most findings in previous literature. In 
Model 2, the effects of ‘credit quality’, ‘ROA’, ‘size’, and ‘type of bank’ are all aligned with the 
expected results; the positive result from ‘inefficiency’ suggests that the effect of ‘bad management’ 






Table 5.10: Test Results of Hypothesis 2 Con’t: Lagged Models (Test 2) 
 Model 3  t-1 (2sls) Model 4  t-2 (2sls) Model 5  t-3 (2sls) 












POGCt-1  -0.050     
POGCt-2    -0.032   
POGCt-3      -0.033 
Type of bank 
(IV) 
0.013***  0.012***  0.011***  
Credit quality 1.730*** 0.392*** 1.270*** 0.358*** 1.224*** 0.284*** 
ROA -0.677 -0.937*** -0.235 -0.832*** -0.284 -1.025*** 
Inefficiency -0.052* -0.013*** -0.036 -0.008** -0.019 -0.007* 
Solvency 0.370* 0.139*** 0.469** 0.158*** 0.549** 0.193*** 
Size -0.040 0.022* -0.039 0.014 -0.023 0.014 


















Coefficient significance: *P<0.10, **P<0.05, ***P<0.01 
 
5.3 Test Results for Hypothesis 3 
Exactly the same statistical tests as Test 2 were run on the Proportion of “two-high and one-over” 
(POTO) (Table 5.11 and 5.12). None of the models show a significant effect of POTO on the NPL 
ratio. In fact, the increment in POTO without lag and with a 1-year lag reduces the NPL ratio, while 
incremental in POTO with 2-year and 3-year increases in NPL ratio. This may suggest that loans to 
“two-high and one-over” industries are likely to default after two to three years. Nonetheless, none of 
the models show enough evidence that allocating fewer loans to “two-high and one-over” industries 
will reduce the NPL ratio of the bank. 
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Table 5.11: Test Results of Hypothesis 3 (Test 3) 
 Model 1 (RE) Model 2 (2sls) 
 NPLR First stage (POGC) Second stage (NPLR) 
POTO -0.011(0.009)  -0.048 
Type of bank (IV)  0.007(0.005)  
Credit quality 0.315(0.045)*** -0.925(0.483)** 0.278(0.084)*** 
ROA -1.305(0.163)*** 0.477(1.890) -1.321(0.178)*** 
Inefficiency -0.002(0.002) -0.034(0.029) -0.004(0.005) 
Solvency 0.084(0.036)** -1.696(0.362)*** 0.020(0.126) 
Size 0.026(0.006)*** 0.096(0.088) 0.033(0.014)** 











Coefficient significance: *P<0.10, **P<0.05, ***P<0.01 
 
Table 5.12: Test Results of Hypothesis 3 Con’t: Lagged Models (Test 3) 
 Model 3  t-1 (2sls) Model 4  t-2 (2sls) Model 5  t-3 (2sls) 












POTOt-1  -0.111     
POTOt-2    0.015   
POTOt-3      0.029 
Type of bank 
(IV) 
0.014  0.011*  0.016**  
Credit quality -2.194*** 0.054 0.780 0.337*** 1.031 0.357*** 
ROA -0.470 -1.241*** 1.976 -0.970*** 4.833** -1.085*** 
Inefficiency 0.104** -0.003 -0.052 -0.002 -0.034 -0.002 
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Solvency -1.300*** 0.047 -1.347*** 0.266*** -1.58*** 0.339*** 
Size 0.108 0.048 -0.087 -0.002 -0.173 -0.012 


























This section further discusses the results from this study. The justification, implications, and 
limitations of the results are explained. Furthermore, future research opportunities are suggested. 
 
6.1 Summary of Results and Justification 
This thesis researched the topic of green finance from the banks’ perspective while specifically 
studying the Chinese banking sector, a rapid growing market of green finance. The financial 
performance and green finance performance of 24 banks from 2009 to 2015 were collected and tested 
with panel regression techniques such as Two-stage Least Square Regression Analysis (2sls) and 
Random-effect Panel Regression (RE).  
The results justify that there are financial incentives for banks to continue to provide green credit. 
The results of the regression analyses indicate that: 1) green credit is an expanding product or service 
that grows at a faster rate than total loans; and 2) allocating large shares of green credit to the loan 
portfolio can reduce credit risk (i.e., NPL ratio of the bank). However, the study failed to confirm that 
allocating fewer shares of loans to high-pollution, high-emission, and overcapacity industries can 
decrease NPL ratio. 
The result of the first test demonstrates that an increase in the growth rate of green credit has a 
positive effect on the growth rate of total loans, and that for every 1% increase in green credit, total 
loans grow by 0.014%. In addition, the descriptive statistics show that the growth rate of green credit 
is always faster than the growth rate of total loans for the period of 2009 to 2015. This result implies 
that green loans can create opportunities for banks to grow their loan business.  
This result is in line with study from Aizawa and Yang (2010). Aizawa and Yang (2010) suggested 
that there are business opportunities for the banking sector in renewable energy projects and carbon 
financing. Banks are willing to offer credit, especially in the early years of a business to gain the first 
mover advantage (FMA) (Weber, 2014b). With these new business opportunities, banks can achieve a 
win–win situation in both financial and sustainability performance (Schaltegger & Wagner, 2011). In 
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fact, the findings are in line with the objective of the Green Credit Policy; namely, having commercial 
banks offer more green loans as a proportion of their total loans. The test results confirm that the 
Green Credit Policy is an effective policy which accomplishes positive outcomes through its 
implementation. 
Although the Chinese government has been making efforts to solve environmental issues, the 
nation still needs more infrastructure for environmental protection. This creates a huge demand for 
green loans, and the banks, in turn, benefit through these opportunities to grow their loan business. 
The result of the second test demonstrates that an increase in green credit to total loans has a 
negative effect on NPL ratio (i.e., the increase reduces NPL ratio). This finding suggests that banks 
can accomplish better risk management performance by adding more sustainable or environment-
friendly investments into their loan portfolio.  
The test results are in line with other empirical studies which find a positive correlation between 
sustainability performance and borrowers’ credit risk (Bauer & Hann 2010; Goss & Roberts 2011; 
Weber, 2016). The test results are also in line with the suggestion by Weber et al. (2015), though the 
results cannot directly confirm that the banks are able to achieve better risk management performance 
because of lower environmental risk (Thompson, 1998). 
In China, subsidies and stimulus packages are offered to encourage projects for energy 
conservation, emission reduction, and ecological environmental protection, as this will reduce the risk 
of the investment dramatically. For instance, the transmission cost of renewable energy is typically 
very high, so electricity suppliers are less willing to take on these renewable energies. However, the 
National Grid, a state-owned enterprise, has been forced to purchase from these renewable energy 
generators at a decent price. With subsidies like this, green loans are even less likely to fail. Some 
scholars have questioned the business model of renewable energy projects, as the government may 
withdraw the subsidies, often without any advanced notice. However, with expectations of higher cost 
of thermal power and lower cost of renewable energy, renewable energy projects are likely to be more 
competitive even without subsidies.  
The third test shows the effect on NPL ratio of allocating more high-pollution, high-emission, and 
overcapacity loans to the total loan portfolio. The idea for this model is also derived from the 
standpoint of environmental risk (Thompson, 1998). While the result from Test 2 confirms that 
having more environment-friendly projects can lower the NPL ratio of the bank, there is no empirical 
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evidence, however, to show that an increase in the number of polluting projects will increase the NPL 
ratio.  
The test results are in contrast with the studies that found a positive correlation between 
sustainability performance and financial performance (Bauer & Hann 2010; Goss & Roberts 2011; 
Weber, 2016). The results also deny the role of environment risk (Thompson, 1998) in polluting 
industry investments. 
In practice, loans to “two-high and one-over” industries do not necessarily have a greater chance to 
default. High-pollution and high-emission corporations may choose to install pollution treatment 
plants to be compliant with regulations. The installation of additional treatment plants may require 
funding and increase the cost of doing business, but consequently, corporations are unlikely to 
become bankrupt. Corporations in the overcapacity industries are anticipated to make transitions. 
They could either divert their business into other fields, or simply cut down their outputs. In fact, 
good financial performance can still be achieved with proper management. As a result, carrying more 
“two-high and one-over” loans may not necessarily increase NPL ratio. 
In addition, the instrumental variable (type of banks) has a significant effect on how much green 
credit a bank allocates. Banks with large amounts of shares controlled by the State and SOEs, such as 
policy banks and state-owned commercial banks, are more willing to allocate a large proportion of 
green credit, according to the test results in the two-stage model. This is in line with suggestions from 
Lardy (2008) and Zhang et al. (2011) – stated owned commercial banks may be an extension of the 
country’s policy in helping achieve the main economic target. 
In contrast to previous studies on NPL by Louzis et al. (2012) and Ghosh (2015), as well as study 
on the correlation between sustainability performance and financial indicators by Weber (2016), this 
study did not find a lagged effect between green credit performance, including both green credit and 
“two-high and one-over” and NPL ratio. The lagged effect happens to normal loans because they are 
unlikely to default during the same year of issuance. The non-existence of the lagged effect may 
suggest that green loans are less likely to default even after several years of borrowing. It turns out 
that the addition of non-default loans to the total loan portfolio dilutes the NPL ratio in the same year, 
but has no further effect in later years. Therefore, the increment in proportion of green credit should 
have the strongest influence on NPL ratio in the same year. 
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With respect to the study on the Green Credit Policy in China, the major contribution of this paper 
is that it closes the literature gaps in empirical studies from the banks’ perspective. Most studies, 
including Cai (2015), Hu and Cao (2011), and Wei, (2010) to name a few, have focused on policy 
analyses, but have not looked at the policy from the lenders’ perspective. A quantitative study from 
Zhao (2015) analyzed the benefit of the Green Credit Policy at a macro level only. This study 
broadens the literature by adding empirical evidence that green loans can create financial benefit for 
banks in China. 
 
6.2 Implications 
This case study of the Chinese banking sector has looked at green finance from the banks’ 
perspective. The conceptual framework (Figure 2.2) suggests that managers who seek better financial 
performance may choose to grow their loan business and minimize default risk. As green loans offer 
new business opportunities and come with lower risks, managers are encouraged to issue more green 
loans because of these financial incentives. Ultimately, the issuance of green loans increases the 
growth of business and reduces the default risk of the loan portfolio, thus achieving the stronger 
financial performance that managers look for. 
While financial incentives and risk management are proven to be the reason why banks participate 
in green finance activities, it would be crucial to understand how this finding might be used to 
achieve the goal of the research. That is, to find out how to enable more green loans globally. In fact, 
the findings may be implied in two different ways. 
First, green finance is proven to have financial benefits to banks, but not all bank managers have 
come to realize this. As mentioned by Cai (2015), some banks treat green loans as they would normal 
loans (but only for environment-friendly projects). Many managers do not choose to integrate 
environmental risk management into their daily business, because they fail to recognize the 
importance of environmental risk management. Other banks in developing countries might not have 
realized the opportunities from green economy transition. Environment issues are simply not creating 
concerns in these countries, so banks are less aware of the potential opportunities. Therefore, 
promoting the financial benefits of green loans to banks managers would potentially encourage more 
banks to participate in green finance activities. 
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Second, the rapid growth of green finance in China has been achieved through the issuance of the 
Green Credit Policy, and other related regulations and incentives. This may also imply that the 
outcome of these policies, regulations and incentives is proving positive. After all, the banking sector 
is not the pioneer of green finance in China. Effective policies, regulations, and incentives are the 
main reason why this successful framework is in place. Therefore, instead of waiting for financial 
institutions to take action, policy-makers may also consider utilizing the policies, regulations and 
incentives that have proven effective outcomes in China.  
 
6.3 Limitations 
While the greatest effort has been made to ensure that the best results are presented, there are still 
some limitations in this research. 
One major limitation is the availability of data. As explained in Section 4.2.2, the lack of green 
finance data created the biggest challenge to this study. Despite the fact that the most relevant 
estimation method is used for data imputation, the results are still based on a few estimated variables. 
It is not a true presentation of the reality, rather it is the closest presentation. Moreover, only few a 
KPIs of green credit implemented are available. Even for those banks that published the data, the data 
were only available for several financial periods. Therefore, this thesis is not able to perform a 
comprehensive analysis based on different KPI on green finance implementation. For example, green 
credit data based on project types are not available, so this thesis is not able to see if providing more 
green credit to certain sectors would create an even lower NPL ratio.  
Although NPL ratio is a good indicator of how much credit risk a bank is taking, it may still be 
biased because the sale of non-performance loans can reduce the NPL ratio. Even though the period 
when banks dumped their NPLs to asset management companies had passed after 2009, there still 
might be some selling of NPLs on a small scale. These artificial changes in NPL ratio are likely to 
have some influence on the outcome of the study, though the influence is expected to be minimal. 
The last limitation is the implication of the study. This research used the Chinese banking sector as 
a case study, but may not be directly applicable to other markets. The Chinese banking industry is a 
unique system which has different banking regulations and macroeconomic environment than do 
other countries. As mentioned in section 3.1.3, State and state-owned enterprises own majority shares 
in major banks in China. This ownership structure is very different from those in other countries. 
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Therefore, the financial benefits of green loans in other markets should be conducted before telling 
whether the finding exists in the respective market. 
 
6.4 Future research 
Future studies on the topic of green finance can be pursued in various ways.  
As mentioned in the last section, one of the limitations of this study is the lack of data. It would be 
interesting to study this case again when more green finance data are available. Finding significant 
outcomes over longer periods will also produce even more convincing results. In addition, doing a 
case study for other regions may be useful in finding out whether the incentives to participate in green 
finance activities are also applicable to other markets. 
Another opportunity for further research is to revisit policy analysis. As mentioned in section 3.5, 
most policy analyses are still theoretical. Currently, there is no study that attempts to value the 
presence of the Green Credit Policy. If the Green Credit Policy is proven to be the driving force of 
green finance activities in China, then adapting a perfected policy globally will quickly solve the 
shortage in green loans. Moreover, the Green Credit Policy has encountered many issues, such as 
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Data Used for Hypotheses Testing 
 (Bold indicates an estimation of variable) 














2009 0.94% 8.95% 
 
1.92% 0.76% 58.12% 5.35% 0.0751 5 20.17% 27.94% 
2010 0.68% 10.99% 
 
2.22% 0.77% 56.15% 6.08% 0.0716 5 49.37% 21.61% 
2011 0.40% 11.91% 
 
2.52% 0.80% 54.25% 6.37% 0.0748 5 32.83% 22.53% 
2012 0.30% 13.17% 
 
2.82% 0.92% 52.42% 6.77% 0.0775 5 28.41% 16.14% 
2013 0.48% 12.51% 
 
3.05% 1.02% 41.84% 6.95% 0.0760 5 5.82% 11.39% 
2014 0.65% 18.08% 
 
3.43% 1.06% 42.61% 6.60% 0.0848 5 60.51% 11.10% 
2015 0.81% 17.05% 
 







2009 1.54% 7.12% 2.27% 2.54% 1.20% 39.05% 5.76% 0.1950 4  25.30% 
2010 1.08% 7.47% 1.93% 2.46% 1.32% 36.63% 6.11% 0.1885 4 24.38% 18.54% 
2011 0.94% 7.58% 1.84% 2.50% 1.44% 36.04% 6.19% 0.1851 4 16.35% 14.70% 
2012 0.85% 6.74% 1.63% 2.50% 1.45% 35.86% 6.43% 0.1805 4 0.51% 13.03% 
2013 0.94% 6.03% 1.45% 2.43% 1.44% 35.26% 6.76% 0.1753 4 0.78% 12.71% 
2014 1.13% 5.94% 1.22% 2.34% 1.40% 34.44% 7.46% 0.1694 4 9.58% 11.13% 





2009 1.50% 3.76% 
 
2.63% 1.24% 39.04% 5.81% 0.1592 4 17.49% 27.04% 
2010 1.14% 3.45% 
 
2.52% 1.32% 37.25% 6.48% 0.1514 4 8.12% 17.62% 
2011 1.09% 3.37% 
 
2.64% 1.47% 36.19% 6.65% 0.1468 4 11.88% 14.59% 
2012 0.99% 3.19% 
 
2.69% 1.47% 36.99% 6.80% 0.1438 4 9.39% 15.64% 
2013 0.99% 5.69% 
 
2.66% 1.47% 36.82% 6.99% 0.1424 4 103.80% 14.35% 
2014 1.19% 5.14% 
 
2.66% 1.42% 35.20% 7.48% 0.1377 4 -0.27% 10.30% 
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2015 1.58% 7.00% 
 





2009 2.91% 1.45% 14.10% 3.06% 0.82% 48.99% 3.86% 0.1470 4  33.48% 
2010 2.03% 1.20% 13.50% 3.40% 0.99% 43.83% 5.25% 0.1448 4 -0.15% 19.78% 
2011 1.55% 1.56% 11.08% 4.08% 1.11% 41.43% 5.56% 0.1396 4 47.65% 13.78% 
2012 1.33% 2.37% 8.64% 4.35% 1.16% 43.02% 5.67% 0.1363 4 72.62% 14.07% 
2013 1.22% 4.57% 7.36% 4.46% 1.20% 42.64% 5.80% 0.1349 4 117.10% 12.30% 
2014 1.54% 5.83% 6.44% 4.42% 1.18% 42.72% 6.46% 0.1313 4 42.98% 12.09% 





2009 1.52% 3.06% 11.07% 2.30% 1.09% 46.00% 6.23% 0.1448 4 47.34% 48.97% 
2010 1.10% 3.39% 9.51% 2.17% 1.15% 44.14% 6.46% 0.1465 4 27.80% 15.28% 
2011 1.00% 3.93% 8.40% 2.20% 1.17% 42.77% 6.40% 0.1414 4 29.82% 12.05% 
2012 0.95% 3.31% 7.62% 2.25% 1.19% 43.62% 6.79% 0.1305 4 -8.79% 8.23% 
2013 0.96% 3.40% 6.76% 2.21% 1.23% 42.28% 6.93% 0.1286 4 13.75% 10.82% 
2014 1.18% 3.55% 5.87% 2.22% 1.22% 38.96% 7.76% 0.1254 4 16.34% 11.51% 





2009 1.36% 5.20% 3.95% 2.05% 1.01% 39.25% 4.97% 0.0548 4  38.44% 
2010 1.12% 4.57% 3.94% 2.08% 1.08% 40.62% 5.66% 0.0554 4 6.99% 21.62% 
2011 0.86% 4.82% 3.21% 2.20% 1.19% 39.02% 5.92% 0.0551 4 20.77% 14.52% 
2012 0.92% 4.89% 2.83% 2.30% 1.18% 39.44% 7.23% 0.0543 4 16.59% 15.05% 
2013 1.05% 5.08% 2.52% 2.24% 1.11% 40.44% 7.07% 0.0552 4 15.14% 10.83% 
2014 1.25% 4.44% 2.15% 2.24% 1.08% 41.01% 7.56% 0.0515 4 -8.08% 5.06% 





2009 0.82% 3.36% 11.16% 2.02% 1.00% 51.16% 4.49% 0.0342 3  35.62% 
2010 0.68% 3.23% 8.71% 2.05% 1.15% 45.87% 5.58% 0.0337 3 16.15% 20.71% 
2011 0.56% 3.11% 7.17% 2.24% 1.39% 42.61% 5.90% 0.0334 3 10.23% 14.64% 
2012 0.61% 5.75% 6.86% 2.16% 1.46% 42.77% 5.88% 0.0351 3 114.87% 16.05% 
2013 0.83% 5.30% 5.52% 2.22% 1.39% 40.92% 6.62% 0.0372 3 6.23% 15.37% 
 
94 
2014 1.11% 6.00% 3.78% 2.59% 1.28% 36.88% 6.61% 0.0392 3 29.71% 14.42% 






2009 0.80% 1.88% 10.40% 1.98% 0.90% 44.71% 4.20% 0.0269 3 41.68% 33.16% 
2010 0.51% 1.87% 11.04% 1.95% 1.01% 40.51% 5.63% 0.0307 3 22.71% 23.43% 
2011 0.44% 1.92% 10.16% 2.19% 1.12% 36.31% 5.57% 0.0321 3 18.89% 16.13% 
2012 0.58% 9.73% 9.54% 2.31% 1.18% 36.66% 5.71% 0.0324 3 489.27% 16.01% 
2013 0.74% 8.61% 8.10% 2.36% 1.21% 33.41% 5.63% 0.0341 3 1.16% 14.43% 
2014 1.06% 7.71% 6.62% 2.65% 1.20% 30.23% 6.27% 0.0345 3 2.81% 14.76% 





2009 0.84% 1.01% 6.69% 1.73% 0.98% 48.86% 6.23% 0.0236 3 264.27% 34.12% 
2010 0.69% 0.28% 5.65% 1.88% 1.09% 46.56% 5.77% 0.0256 3 -67.35% 19.77% 
2011 0.63% 0.19% 5.21% 2.23% 1.40% 43.13% 6.02% 0.0267 3 -19.22% 13.96% 
2012 0.76% 0.09% 4.54% 2.39% 1.41% 41.70% 5.25% 0.0331 3 -46.89% 14.88% 
2013 0.85% 0.31% 5.94% 2.21% 1.34% 39.59% 6.33% 0.0299 3 294.23% 13.70% 
2014 1.17% 0.49% 3.46% 2.12% 1.26% 40.06% 6.17% 0.0330 3  15.14% 
2015 1.60% 0.56% 3.08% 2.46% 1.10% 37.84% 6.85% 0.0327 3  12.99% 
Industrial 
Bank (CIB) 
2009 0.54% 2.36% 8.88% 1.37% 1.13% 44.02% 4.47% 0.0220 3 401.91% 40.49% 
2010 0.42% 5.60% 8.13% 1.38% 1.16% 39.62% 4.97% 0.0259 3 188.66% 21.77% 
2011 0.38% 7.58% 7.32% 1.46% 1.20% 39.12% 4.82% 0.0288 3 55.73% 15.09% 
2012 0.43% 9.16% 7.02% 2.00% 1.23% 33.29% 5.25% 0.0335 3 51.06% 25.01% 
2013 0.76% 13.12% 3.91% 2.68% 1.20% 33.88% 5.47% 0.0341 3 58.16% 10.40% 
2014 1.10% 18.58% 3.44% 2.76% 1.18% 31.07% 5.93% 0.0362 3 66.20% 17.40% 




2009 0.95% 1.41% 10.16% 1.42% 0.94% 46.68% 6.03% 0.0294 3 61.86% 45.90% 
2010 0.67% 1.27% 9.04% 1.44% 1.13% 40.17% 5.98% 0.0292 3 7.46% 18.64% 
2011 0.60% 1.28% 7.88% 1.62% 1.27% 36.81% 6.46% 0.0331 3 13.57% 13.43% 
2012 0.74% 1.14% 5.69% 2.12% 1.10% 38.99% 6.86% 0.0305 3 3.61% 15.96% 
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2013 1.03% 1.07% 4.48% 2.13% 1.20% 38.58% 6.34% 0.0337 3 9.51% 16.73% 
2014 1.30% 1.15% 3.36% 2.36% 1.07% 37.49% 6.46% 0.0340 3 21.23% 12.71% 




2009 1.25% 0.20% 3.59% 2.59% 0.75% 46.89% 4.02% 0.0198 3  38.52% 
2010 0.75% 0.29% 4.28% 2.35% 0.95% 42.15% 5.49% 0.0208 3  20.01% 
2011 0.64% 0.45% 4.06% 2.36% 1.12% 39.59% 5.55% 0.0207 3  14.25% 
2012 0.74% 3.15% 3.69% 2.53% 1.18% 37.76% 5.02% 0.0235 3 699.63% 14.99% 
2013 0.86% 2.80% 3.38% 2.07% 1.14% 40.40% 6.34% 0.0224 3 1.50% 13.99% 
2014 1.19% 2.68% 2.32% 2.16% 1.12% 38.10% 6.56% 0.0225 3 6.38% 11.42% 
2015 1.61% 2.56% 2.10% 2.52% 1.00% 34.65% 7.07% 0.0229 3 11.33% 16.48% 
Ping An 
Bank 
2009 0.68% 1.07% 9.11% 1.10% 0.94% 49.02% 3.44% 0.0097 3  26.71% 
2010 0.58% 1.21% 9.59% 1.58% 0.95% 48.32% 4.57% 0.0102 3  13.32% 
2011 0.53% 0.85% 9.29% 1.70% 1.04% 48.45% 5.99% 0.0150 3 6.66% 52.35% 
2012 0.95% 1.53% 7.70% 1.74% 0.94% 47.99% 5.28% 0.0165 3 109.83% 16.13% 
2013 0.89% 1.52% 7.13% 1.79% 0.87% 48.56% 5.92% 0.0175 3 16.67% 17.55% 
2014 1.02% 1.50% 1.34% 2.06% 0.97% 43.80% 5.99% 0.0180 3 19.32% 20.94% 
2015 1.45% 1.42% 1.08% 2.41% 0.93% 38.25% 6.44% 0.0182 3 12.42% 18.68% 
Hua Xia 
Bank (HXB) 
2009 1.50% 2.60% 13.83% 2.50% 0.44% 52.20% 3.58% 0.0140 3  21.03% 
2010 1.18% 2.62% 9.63% 2.48% 0.61% 50.00% 3.41% 0.0146 3  22.71% 
2011 0.92% 2.79% 7.11% 2.82% 0.74% 48.92% 5.14% 0.0149 3  15.82% 
2012 0.88% 5.08% 5.16% 2.82% 0.87% 47.15% 5.02% 0.0153 3 18.25% 17.78% 
2013 0.90% 4.21% 3.39% 2.73% 0.98% 46.15% 5.14% 0.0155 3 -5.28% 14.30% 
2014 1.09% 4.20% 2.57% 2.54% 1.02% 45.04% 5.51% 0.0152 3 13.79% 14.19% 




2009 2.40% 1.36% 4.72% 3.74% 0.56% 57.09% 3.33% 0.0110 3  22.19% 
2010 1.58% 1.03% 3.99% 3.30% 0.84% 48.55% 5.27% 0.0114 3  22.57% 
2011 1.34% 1.09% 3.95% 3.10% 1.11% 47.62% 5.74% 0.0110 3 22.25% 15.71% 
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2012 1.48% 0.75% 3.19% 2.52% 1.08% 49.23% 5.44% 0.0120 3 -21.97% 13.99% 
2013 0.87% 0.66% 2.97% 1.56% 0.88% 51.12% 4.99% 0.0136 3 2.55% 16.07% 
2014 1.04% 0.53% 2.59% 1.77% 0.77% 45.59% 5.31% 0.0135 3 -11.71% 10.67% 




2009 0.10% 0.77% 
 
1.20% 0.29% 64.74% 4.46% 0.0019 3  100.68% 
2010 0.11% 0.97% 
 
1.51% 0.41% 58.58% 3.55% 0.0037 3  32.55% 
2011 0.14% 1.17% 
 
1.70% 0.64% 51.67% 5.28% 0.0037 3 47.75% 21.76% 
2012 0.14% 2.05% 
 
1.85% 0.85% 45.79% 4.20% 0.0049 3 120.00% 25.71% 
2013 0.26% 2.66% 
 
2.21% 0.88% 41.05% 4.26% 0.0053 3 54.00% 18.68% 
2014 1.20% 3.23% 
 
2.46% 0.81% 41.21% 4.42% 0.0055 3 48.54% 22.31% 
2015 1.35% 4.08% 
 




2009 1.02% 0.91% 
 
2.21% 1.19% 34.25% 7.04% 0.0088 1 33.33% 41.65% 
2010 0.69% 0.70% 
 
2.13% 1.07% 37.34% 5.81% 0.0103 1 -6.60% 22.40% 
2011 0.53% 0.63% 
 
2.35% 1.06% 33.54% 5.27% 0.0114 1 9.85% 21.17% 
2012 0.59% 2.01% 
 
2.67% 1.13% 32.84% 6.40% 0.0115 1 290.18% 22.46% 
2013 0.65% 1.88% 
 
2.74% 1.10% 32.82% 5.86% 0.0124 1 9.76% 17.74% 
2014 0.86% 2.67% 
 
3.05% 1.09% 31.85% 6.31% 0.0125 1 63.86% 15.46% 
2015 1.12% 3.35% 
 
3.54% 1.00% 31.39% 6.33% 0.0134 1 42.22% 14.82% 
Bank of 
Nanjing 
2009 1.22% 1.28% 
 
2.12% 1.28% 38.51% 8.14% 0.0025 1  66.82% 
2010 0.97% 1.60% 
 
2.27% 1.25% 36.92% 8.56% 0.0031 1  25.16% 
2011 0.78% 2.03% 
 
2.53% 1.29% 37.68% 7.74% 0.0034 1  22.54% 
2012 0.83% 2.60% 
 
2.64% 1.28% 36.95% 7.22% 0.0035 1  21.85% 
2013 0.89% 2.78% 
 
2.66% 1.16% 39.09% 6.19% 0.0040 1 25.10% 17.32% 
2014 0.94% 5.44% 
 
3.06% 1.12% 35.87% 5.72% 0.0047 1 132.84% 18.86% 
2015 0.83% 4.93% 
 
3.57% 1.02% 31.72% 6.51% 0.0058 1 30.45% 43.80% 
2009 1.59% 0.50% 1.59% 2.68% 0.87% 88.15% 4.62% 0.0077 1  37.47% 






2011 0.98% 0.59% 1.31% 2.71% 0.95% 93.43% 5.38% 0.0078 1 9.64% 12.12% 
2012 0.84% 0.55% 1.27% 2.39% 1.02% 93.85% 5.17% 0.0084 1 7.71% 16.72% 
2013 0.82% 0.75% 1.21% 2.39% 1.04% 90.05% 5.76% 0.0091 1 54.68% 13.05% 
2014 0.98% 0.56% 1.20% 2.54% 1.05% 81.18% 6.26% 0.0098 1 -17.31% 9.75% 
2015 1.19% 0.67% 1.17% 2.82% 0.99% 76.37% 6.41% 0.0105 1 32.14% 10.73% 
Bank of 
Jiangsu 
2009 1.45% 1.03% 
 
2.30% 0.94% 45.40% 4.55% 0.0055 1  44.14% 
2010 1.06% 1.27% 
 
2.22% 1.10% 42.49% 5.27% 0.0060 1  23.65% 
2011 0.96% 1.58% 
 
2.54% 1.24% 40.49% 5.41% 0.0061 1  21.41% 
2012 1.01% 1.67% 
 
2.67% 1.21% 40.26% 5.25% 0.0067 1 27.48% 21.11% 
2013 1.15% 1.70% 
 
2.58% 1.16% 39.12% 6.27% 0.0071 1 19.59% 16.89% 
2014 1.30% 2.87% 
 
2.69% 0.97% 36.63% 5.40% 0.0085 1 99.46% 18.66% 
2015 1.43% 4.33% 1.00% 2.74% 0.82% 36.47% 5.08% 0.0093 1 73.57% 15.00% 
Bank of 
Ningbo 
2009 0.79% 0.35% 10.37% 1.34% 1.09% 47.92% 5.96% 0.0027 1  66.54% 
2010 0.69% 0.38% 6.53% 1.36% 1.09% 46.74% 6.03% 0.0037 1  24.08% 
2011 0.68% 0.47% 4.22% 1.63% 1.24% 43.76% 7.18% 0.0031 1 49.49% 20.84% 
2012 0.76% 0.76% 1.97% 2.10% 1.29% 40.81% 5.98% 0.0038 1 89.88% 18.63% 
2013 0.89% 0.93% 1.54% 2.27% 1.16% 40.91% 5.52% 0.0043 1 43.07% 17.56% 
2014 0.89% 0.77% 1.49% 2.53% 1.11% 37.83% 6.17% 0.0046 1 1.83% 22.71% 
2015 0.92% 0.67% 0.75% 2.85% 1.03% 39.54% 6.29% 0.0052 1 6.61% 21.72% 
Bank of 
Chongqing 
2009 0.47% 4.10% 
 
1.80% 1.28% 43.08% 4.99% 0.0013 1  46.75% 
2010 0.36% 4.11% 
 
1.91% 1.16% 39.92% 4.61% 0.0015 1  25.35% 
2011 0.35% 4.27% 
 
1.87% 1.26% 40.63% 5.07% 0.0015 1  20.87% 
2012 0.33% 4.49% 
 
1.80% 1.36% 40.82% 5.29% 0.0016 1  19.70% 
2013 0.39% 4.78% 
 
2.06% 1.28% 38.86% 6.52% 0.0019 1  18.10% 
2014 0.69% 4.97% 
 
2.19% 1.17% 37.48% 5.79% 0.0023 1 22.27% 17.62% 
2015 0.97% 5.48% 
 
2.37% 1.07% 37.13% 6.66% 0.0023 1 29.22% 17.21% 
Harbin Bank 2009 0.99% 0.56% 
 
1.59% 1.08% 44.85% 4.65% 0.0014 1  29.37% 
 
98 
2010 0.79% 0.54% 
 
1.53% 1.17% 38.27% 4.17% 0.0018 1  24.09% 
2011 0.62% 0.52% 
 
2.14% 1.12% 41.61% 5.58% 0.0025 1  26.76% 
2012 0.64% 0.49% 
 
2.25% 1.20% 39.24% 6.27% 0.0028 1  27.42% 
2013 0.85% 0.76% 
 
2.29% 1.14% 42.03% 6.19% 0.0030 1 87.82% 21.40% 
2014 1.13% 0.46% 
 
2.35% 1.15% 43.24% 8.75% 0.0028 1 -29.05% 16.98% 
2015 1.40% 0.51% 0.37% 2.43% 1.14% 39.66% 7.61% 0.0032 1 32.16% 19.97% 
Bank of 
Zhengzhou 
2009 1.51% 0.01% 
 
2.81% 0.59% 39.50% 5.01% 0.0007 1  24.69% 
2010 0.51% 0.02% 
 
2.17% 1.26% 40.95% 4.80% 0.0008 1  32.66% 
2011 0.44% 0.04% 
 
1.84% 1.47% 36.78% 8.76% 0.0008 1  39.58% 
2012 0.47% 0.07% 6.32% 2.01% 1.67% 30.52% 7.39% 0.0011 1  34.10% 
2013 0.53% 0.05% 6.17% 2.24% 1.50% 32.42% 6.39% 0.0014 1 -5.71% 25.48% 
2014 0.75% 0.18% 
 
2.26% 1.39% 33.46% 5.58% 0.0017 1 327.27% 23.90% 
2015 1.10% 0.57% 
 
2.85% 1.43% 28.66% 6.71% 0.0019 1 281.56% 20.91% 
 
 
  
 
